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1. Introduction 
In this  paper,  we  develop  a small,  structural econometric  model  to be 
used  in the quantitative  evaluation  of proposed  rules for monetary  pol- 
icy.  The  quantitative  evaluation  of  monetary  policy  rules  has  gained 
increased  attention  in  recent  years  (see,  e.g.,  McCallum,  1988,  1997; 
Taylor, 1993a; Bryant,  Hooper,  and  Mann,  1993; Henderson  and  Mc- 
Kibbin, 1993; Feldstein  and  Stock,  1994; Leeper and Sims,  1994; Levin, 
1996; and Fuhrer 1997a). Our approach differs from these studies in that 
we  derive  our  econometric  specification  from an  explicit  model  of in- 
tertemporal optimization  on the part of both the suppliers  and the pur- 
chasers of goods  and services.1 
Rigorously grounding  our structural relations in optimizing  individual 
behavior  has two  important advantages.  The first is that we  are able to 
respond  to the well-known  Lucas (1976) critique of econometric  policy 
evaluation.  Our analysis of hypothetical  policy rules takes full account of 
the way  that an understanding  of the change  in policy regime ought  to 
affect the decision  rules of private agents,  and make them different than 
those  that  underlie  the  statistical  correlations  observed  in  past  data. 
We wish to thank Eduardo  Loyo for superb research  assistance, Ben Bernanke,  Frank 
Diebold, Jeff  Fuhrer,  Bennett McCallum,  and Chris Sims for helpful comments, and the 
NSF for research  support. 
1. Leeper  and Sims (1994)  made an ambitious  effort  of this kind, although,  unlike  us, they 
do not derive their  price  dynamics  from  producer  optimization.  Ireland  (1997)  is another 
recent  study with an aim similar  to ours, although  our approaches  differ  considerably  in 
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Much of the recent work cited above does  respond  to the Lucas critique 
to at least  some  extent,  by incorporating  forward-looking  specifications 
of  at least  some  of  the  models'  structural relations,  and  assuming  ra- 
tional  (or model-consistent)  expectations  in analyzing  alternative  poli- 
cies.  But because  no  attempt  is made  to derive  the complete  structural 
model from internally consistent  foundations  in terms of individual opti- 
mization,  doubts  must remain as to whether  the posited  structural rela- 
tions should  genuinely  be invariant to changes  in the policy regime. 
Demanding  that one's  structural relations be derived  from individual 
optimization  also  has  the  advantage  that evidence  from other  sources 
about  the  nature  of the  problems  that individuals  face can be  used  to 
corroborate the  quantitative  specifications  that are used  to explain  the 
relations among aggregate time series. Ultimately, this is the only way in 
which the "observational equivalence" of a multitude of alternative possi- 
ble structural interpretations  of the comovements  of aggregate series can 
be resolved.  We make little attempt here at such validation  of our pro- 
posed  specification.  But because  our  model  parameters  refer to  con- 
cepts,  such  as  the  elasticity  of  firms'  demand  curves,  or the  average 
length  of time  that prices  remain fixed,  that have  clear referents  apart 
from the role of these parameters in our structural relations linking inter- 
est  rates,  inflation,  and  output  in the economy  as a whole,  it becomes 
possible  to consider  the reasonableness  of our specification  on grounds 
other than simple  statistical measures  of goodness  of fit. 
The second  advantage  of an optimization-based  approach is that the 
specification  of individuals'  decision  problems that is used to explain the 
effects  of  monetary  policy  can  also  be  used  for  purposes  of  welfare 
analysis.  Of  course,  the  analysis  of  the  deadweight  losses  associated 
with  alternative  policies  in terms of the individual  preferences  that ac- 
count  for  the  predicted  responses  to  a  policy  change  is  by  now  the 
standard  method  of  the  public-finance  literature. But this  method  has 
been  little applied  to problems  of monetary  policy, the main exception 
being  analyses  of the special issue  of the costs of steady  inflation  (e.g., 
Lucas, 1993). Analyses  of optimal monetary policy-or  at least those that 
are based  upon  econometric  models-consider  instead  the problem  of 
minimizing  one ad hoc loss  function  or another. Here we  show,  instead, 
how  a  utility-based  measure  of  the  deadweight  loss  associated  with 
price-level instability can be derived,  and how most of its parameters can 
be determined  from our estimated  structural equations.  We can use this 
measure  to address  questions  such as Summers's  (1991) suggestion  that 
a positive  average rate of inflation is desirable in order to make it possi- 
ble for nominal  interest rates to be lowered  as necessary  for stabilization 
purposes.  Not  only  does  our  econometric  model  allow  us  to  discuss Optimization-Based  Econometric  Framework  *  299 
quantitatively  how  much  variability of nominal  interest  rates would  be 
necessary  for  full  stabilization,  but  our  welfare  measure  in  principle 
allows  a  direct  comparison,  in  comparable  units,  of  the  deadweight 
losses  associated  with  incomplete  stabilization  on  the  one  hand  and 
higher average inflation on the other. 
Our analysis  proceeds  in five distinct steps.  In the first step,  we  esti- 
mate a vector autoregression  (VAR) model of the joint process of interest 
rates, inflation,  and output.  We use this VAR for two purposes.  The first 
is  to  identify  the  actual  monetary  policy  rule  employed  by  the  Fed. 
Following  Taylor (1993b), we suppose  that this rule is a reaction function 
that sets interest rates as a function of current and past values  of output 
and  inflation.  The  second  purpose  of this  VAR is to estimate  the way 
output,  inflation,  and interest  rates respond  to a stochastic disturbance 
to the monetary  policy  rule. Thus we  learn how  the economy  responds 
to a monetary  shock under the current monetary policy rule, using fairly 
standard  "structural VAR" methodology  (e.g.,  Cochrane,  1994; Leeper, 
Sims, and Zha,  1996). 
In the  second  step,  we  postulate  a simple  theoretical model  that can 
account  for the estimated  response  of output  and inflation to monetary 
policy  shocks.  In this model,  we  assume  that there are impediments  to 
the free adjustment  of prices.  In particular, we consider a variant of the 
Calvo  (1983) model  in  which  a firm's  opportunity  to  change  its  price 
arrives stochastically  and where,  if this opportunity  does  not arise, the 
firm  must  keep  its  price  constant.  We choose  the  parameters  of  this 
extremely  stylized  model  so  that  the  model's  predicted  responses  to 
monetary  policy  shocks  match  as closely  as possible  the  estimated  re- 
sponses  from the VAR. 
In the third step, we combine the quantitative specification of the struc- 
tural model  (with  the parameters obtained  in step two) with  the vector 
autoregression  model  to identify  the shocks to the structural equations. 
The failure of the VAR to contain any stochastic singularities implies that 
the  model's  structural equations  have  residuals  as well,  which  we  can 
interpret in the context of the model as indicating stochastic variation in 
preferences  and technology.  We compute  what these  disturbances  have 
been  over our sample  period,  and use  the VAR representation  to deter- 
mine the stochastic process followed by the real disturbances. One impor- 
tant  advantage  of  our  method  of  analyses  is  that,  once  we  take  into 
account these constructed  disturbances,  our model fits the data nearly as 
well as an unrestricted  vector autoregression.  This good  fit provides  an 
additional  rationale for being interested  in the model's  implications con- 
cerning monetary  policy. 
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estimated  in  step  two  and  shock  processes  estimated  in  step  three  to 
simulate  the consequences  of hypothetical  monetary policy rules. Using 
the estimated  historical shock series,  we can simulate alternative histori- 
cal paths for the U.S. economy. In particular, we can compute the realiza- 
tions  of output,  inflation,  and interest  rates under counterfactual rules. 
What is particularly attractive about this exercise is that, under the actual 
monetary  rule  estimated  in  step  one,  the  simulated  paths  of  output, 
inflation,  and  interest  rates are identical  to the actual paths.  Thus,  the 
simulations  with counterfactual rules provide alternative historical paths 
for the U.S.  economy. 
In the fifth and final step, we use the parameters estimated in step two 
to compute  the welfare consequences  of different monetary rules. More- 
over,  we  derive  the  rule that would  have  maximized  the utility  of our 
representative  households  given  the  shock  processes  obtained  in  step 
three. 
2.  The  Effects  of Monetary  Policy  Shocks  under  the  Current 
Policy  Regime 
In this section,  we  describe our econometric  characterization of the cur- 
rent monetary  policy  regime,  and our estimates  of the effects of mone- 
tary policy  shocks  under  that  regime.  By monetary  shocks  we  mean 
exogenous  stochastic  shifts  in the feedback rule used  by the Fed to set 
the Federal funds  rate. Our interest in the effects of such shifts does  not 
derive  from  a  belief  that  they  have  played  an  important  role  in  the 
generation  of fluctuations  in either output or inflation in the period with 
which we are concerned.  Rather, we are interested in them because they 
can  be  econometrically  identified  without  our  having  to  commit  our- 
selves  to  detailed  assumptions  about  the  true  structural relations  that 
determine  output  and inflation. 
The  monetary  policy  shocks  and  their  effects  cannot,  of  course,  be 
identified  without  at least some weak a priori  assumptions.  In particular, 
we  assume  that  recent  U.S.  monetary  policy  may  be  described  by  a 
feedback rule for the federal funds  rate of the form 
nr  n.r  ny 
rt =  r* +  E  u'k(rt- 
-  r*) +  k(rt-k  )  +  OYt-k +  et,  (2.1) 
k=l  k=O  k=O 
where rt  is the Federal funds rate in period t, and ir, is the rate of inflation 
between  periods  t -  1 and t, yt is the percentage  deviation  of real GDP 
from trend, and r* and Ti*  are long-run  "target" values for the funds rate Optimization-Based  Econometric  Framework  *  301 
and the rate of inflation respectively. The Et's  represent exogenous  mone- 
tary policy  shocks,  which  are assumed  to be  serially uncorrelated.  In 
assuming  that  monetary  policy  shocks  may  be  identified  with  move- 
ments  in the  federal funds  rate that cannot be predicted  given  the his- 
tory of the funds  rate, or by current and past values  of other macro time 
series  such  as output  and inflation,  we  follow  a large part of the recent 
"structural  VAR" literature  on  the  identification  of  monetary  policy 
shocks, beginning  with Bemanke and Blinder (1992) and including Coch- 
rane  (1994) and  Leeper,  Sims,  and Zha (1996). In our assumption  of a 
feedback  rule  of  the  specific  form  (2.1) as  a representation  of  current 
policy, we  follow  the monetary-policy  "reaction function" literature, es- 
pecially  Taylor (1993b). Taylor (1993b) asserts  that,  at least  under  the 
chairmanship  of Alan Greenspan  (i.e.,  at least since late 1987), Fed pol- 
icy has been well  described by a rule of this kind.2 
Identification  of the monetary  policy shocks  {(t}  and estimation  of the 
coefficients  in  (2.1) require a further identifying  assumption  about the 
correlation between  Et  and  the  period-t  endogenous  variables.  Our as- 
sumption  is that a monetary policy shock at date t has no effect on either 
output  or inflation  during  period  t; the  idea  is  that both  pricing  and 
purchasing  decisions  for period t are made prior to the realization of the 
shock,  i.e.,  before the period-t funds rate is observed.  (In the theoretical 
model  proposed  in  the  next  section  as  an  interpretation  of  our  VAR 
results,  this assumption  is made  explicit.) An alternative interpretation 
of our restriction is that pricing and purchasing decisions  for period t are 
made  during  period  t, but on  the basis  of incomplete  information-in 
particular, without  information about current money-market  conditions. 
The use  of such decision lags as an identifying  assumption  is common  in 
the  structural VAR literature,  beginning  with  Sims  (1986). Under  this 
assumption,  equation  (2.1) can be estimated  using  OLS.3 
Note  that this identifying  assumption  requires that we  interpret any 
correlation between  the period-t  innovations  in inflation or output  and 
the period-t innovation  in the funds  rate as due to the way in which the 
Fed reacts to variations in inflation and output in setting the funds rate. 
2. According  to Taylor's  much-discussed  account  of recent  policy,  n,= 0, n, = 3, ny  0, tr* 
= 2%/year,  r* = 4%/year,  and the coefficients  are given by  k = 1.5/4 for k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 
and 00  = 0.5. Taylor  presents  these values as a rough  rule of thumb  rather  than a precise 
quantitative specification. It is clear that actual policy involves a greater degree of 
interest-rate  smoothing than the simple "Taylor  rule"  would predict;  hence our allow- 
ance for lagged funds-rate  terms  in our generalization  (2.1)  of Taylor's  rule. 
3. Note that the constants r* and  T  cannot be separately  estimated from this equation  alone. We are able to estimate them when we estimate our complete VAR  model, by 
assuming that no equation  of the three-variable  VAR  model contains  a constant  term, if 
the three state variables  are all written  in terms  of deviations  from  their  long-run  values. 302 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
It is therefore necessary  that we deny the existence of "information lags" 
in  the  monetary  policy  rule,  if  we  are  to  avoid  imposing  any  over- 
identifying  restrictions  at this stage in our characterization of the data. 
This is why  the coefficients  00 and 00  are allowed  to be nonzero  in (2.1). 
We find, in fact, a significant positive  coefficient 00. This is because there 
is  a significant  positive  correlation between  the  funds-rate  innovation 
and the contemporaneous  output  innovation.  Since we  would  expect a 
negative  correlation, if any, if the current output realization had no effect 
on  monetary  policy  (while  a  positive  correlation  is  entirely  plausible 
under the assumption  that policy does  respond  to an output innovation 
within  the  quarter),  the  assumption  of  a  decision  lag  for  the  Fed  is 
unattractive,  at least as regards the response  to output innovations.4 
We estimate  (2.1) as part of a three-variable just-identified  VAR model, 
where  the variables included  are the funds  rate, the inflation rate, and 
detrended  real GDP.5  We estimate a complete  system  of this kind, so that 
we  obtain not merely  an estimated  Fed reaction function,  but also esti- 
mated  impulse  responses  to monetary  policy  shocks  under  the  policy 
regime  characterized  by  that reaction function.  The three variables in- 
cluded  represent  a minimal  set for our purposes:  they  are the minimal 
set  needed  to allow  us  to estimate  a monetary  policy  rule of the kind 
proposed  by Taylor (1993b), and  they  allow  us  to model  the  effects  of 
monetary policy on fluctuations  in the three variables that central banks 
are most  often  supposed  to concern  themselves  with  as ultimate  goal 
variables. 
The sample period for our estimation of (2.1) runs from 1980:1 through 
1995:2. We begin  our  sample  in  the  first quarter of  1980, because  it is 
widely  recognized  that a significant change in the U.S. monetary  policy 
regime  occurred  around  that  time;  thus  at least  one  equation  of  our 
model,  the  monetary  policy  rule  (2.1),  cannot  be  expected  to have  re- 
mained  invariant  over  a longer  time period  than the  one  that we  use. 
Many, of course, would  doubt that the monetary policy rule has remained 
unchanged  since  then.  Conventional  accounts  of the succession  of U.S. 
monetary  policy regimes often identify important regime changes  in late 
1982 (the  end  of  the  Fed's  experiment  with  targeting  of nonborrowed 
reserves)  and  late  1987 (the  transition  from Volcker to  Greenspan)  as 
4. The assumption made with regard to inflation  innovations has little effect upon our 
results. Table  1 shows that the estimated  coefficient  40 is in any event both small and 
statistically  insignificant. 
5. Our desire to model GDP leads us to use quarterly  data. Our {rt}  series is the federal 
funds rate, annualized and averaged over the quarter.  Our {Trt}  series is the quarterly 
change in the log of the GDP  deflator,  also annualized.  Finally,  our {yt}  series  is the log of 
real GDP,  with a linear  time trend  removed. Optimization-Based  Econometric  Framework  *  303 
well.6 Our choice of the longest  among several possible  samples is deter- 
mined by a desire to have long enough  time series to allow estimation of 
an unrestricted  VAR model.  In fact, most  VAR studies  of the effects  of 
monetary policy shocks make use of much longer data samples than ours. 
Our choice  of a sample  period represents  a compromise  between  these 
two concerns. 
Estimation  of a VAR that includes  (2.1) as one equation  could be car- 
ried out in various ways.  Perhaps the most obvious would be to estimate 
a recursive VAR with state vector [Itr, Yt,  rt ', in which the causal ordering 
of the variables is the order in which  they are listed. An alternative, that 
we follow  here,  is to estimate a recursive VAR with state vector 
Zt =  [rt,  rt+l, Yt+ll '  (2.2) 
with  the  interest  rate now  first in the  causal ordering.  Specifically, we 
estimate  a system  of the form 
TZt = AZ,  +  t',  (2.3) 
where  the  vector  Zt is  the  transpose  of  [Zt,  Zt_,t  Z-2],  T is  a lower 
triangular matrix with  ones  on  the  diagonal  and  nonzero  off-diagonal 
elements  only in the first three rows,  and A is a matrix whose  first three 
rows contain estimated  coefficients from the VAR. The first three rows of 
et's  contain the VAR residuals,  while  the other elements  are zero.7 
This  notation  is  unfamiliar  in  that  some  data  for period  t  +  1 are 
included  in the period-t state vector. The reason is that, according to our 
assumption  about  decision  lags,  these  variables,  which  are  only  ob- 
served  in  period  t  +  1,  are  nonetheless  determined  on  the  basis  of 
information  that,  according  to our model,  decision  makers have  in pe- 
riod t. We prefer this choice of notation because  it allows  us to describe 
the information  used  by decision  makers in terms of the history  of the 
vector {Zt}.  Specifically, we  can refer to the information set consisting  of 
the  history  {Zt,_} for all j  ,  0 as  the  period-t information  set. Then  the 
information used in choosing  price changes  that take effect in period t + 
1 and  quantities  to be  purchased  in  period  t  +  1 may  be  taken  to be 
exactly  the  period-t  information  set; similarly, the information  used  in 
6. See, e.g., Strongin  (1995)  and Bemanke  and Mihov (1995).  Taylor  (1993b)  proposes his 
feedback  rule only as an account  of Fed policy since late 1987. 
7. Three  lags in (2.3) suffice to eliminate  any significant  serial  correlation  in the residuals, 
and the estimated  coefficients  on longer lags are also insignificant.  Note that this form 
differs  from  the other,  more familiar  form  in the numbers  of lags of the various  variables 
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setting  the  funds  rate in  period  t  +  1 is the  period-t  information  set, 
except  that the Fed's action involves  a random disturbance  Et+,  as well. 
The first row  of the  estimated  system  (2.3) corresponds  to the  mon- 
etary-policy  feedback  rule  (2.1),  and  the  first element  of  the  residual 
vector  Ft represents  our  identification  of  the  monetary  shock  Et.  The 
coefficients  of  the  estimated  policy  rule are displayed  in Table 1. The 
estimated  rule may be described  as a generalized  "Taylor rule," though 
the  dynamics  are more  complex  than  in Taylor's simple  specification. 
One  way  to  measure  the  overall  responsiveness  of  the  funds  rate to 
fluctuations  in inflation  and output  is in terms of long-run  multipliers, 
which  indicate  the eventual  increase in the funds  rate that would  result 
in the case of a permanent  change  in the levels  of inflation and output. 
These long-run  multipliers  are given by8 
r -  r* = 2.13(7r -  7r*)  + 0.47y.  (2.4) 
Thus, as in Taylor's rule, an increase in GDP relative to trend raises the 
funds  rate (and our estimated  long-run multiplier is essentially  the same 
as that indicated  by Taylor), and  an increase  in inflation  relative  to its 
"target" level  raises  the funds  rate by an even  greater amount  (so that 
short-term  real interest  rates rise). Our estimate  of the sensitivity  of the 
funds  rate to inflation  fluctuations  is even  stronger than Taylor's coeffi- 
cient; this may well  be due  to our inclusion  of the Volcker years in our 
sample.  Differences  in our dynamic  specification  include  our finding  of 
significant  interest-rate  smoothing  (the  coefficients  Ik  are all positive, 
and sum to 0.7),  our finding  that an increase in inflation does  not begin 
to increase  the  funds  rate until  the  following  quarter, and  our finding 
that the short-run multiplier for output is larger than the long-run multi- 
plier (owing  to the negative  value for 02). 
The  complete  estimated  system  also  allows  us  to  compute  the  re- 
sponse  of  output,  inflation,  and  interest  rates  to  a  monetary  policy 
shock.  These impulse  responses  are plotted in the three panels of Figure 
1. In each panel,  the central dashed  line indicates  the point estimate  of 
the impulse  response  function,  while  the two outer dot-dash  lines indi- 
cate a confidence  interval for each coefficient (plus and minus two times 
the standard error), based  on analytic derivatives  of the responses  with 
respect  to the parameters and on the variance-covariance  matrix of the 
parameters. 
8. Though  these  cannot  be  read  off  from  the  regression  reported  in  Table 1 alone,  we 
estimate  long-run  values  'r* =  3.26% and  r* =  6.25%. We thus  estimate  a long-run 
average  real funds  rate of 3%. These values  compare with Taylor's assumption  of a 2% 
real rate and a 2% inflation target. Optimization-Based  Econometric  Framework  305 
Table 1  THE VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION 
SAMPLE: 1980:1-1995:2a 
Independent 
variable  R  Y  variab  Rt  7r +  1  Yt+111 
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ii 
Figure  1 ESTIMATED  AND THEORETICAL  RESPONSES  TO A MONETARY 
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Responses  are plotted  for a one-standard-deviation  shock that raises 
the  funds  rate unexpectedly  by  about  0.8%. The  estimated  responses 
largely  agree  with  conventional  wisdom:  interest  rates are raised only 
temporarily  (according  our  estimates,  only  for the  first two  quarters); 
output  subsequently  declines  (not  noticeably  until  two  quarters later), 
but eventually  returns to normal; and inflation also declines  with  a lag 
(with  the  greatest  decline  occurring  two  quarters later).  These  effects 
cannot be estimated  with much precision  (especially the effects on infla- 
tion).  Nonetheless,  they  give  us  an idea  of the features that our struc- 
tural model  should  possess  in order to be consistent  with  the data.  In 
particular, a monetary  tightening  should  temporarily lower both output 
and inflation; and these  effects should  occur only with a lag of a couple 
of quarters-so  that the effects on output and inflation largely occur after 
short-term interest rates have returned to their normal level. 
These  results  agree qualitatively with  those  that emerge  from several 
recent  VAR exercises,  including  Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and  Evans 
(1994) and,  more relevantly  (because  he considers  a three-variable VAR 
similar to ours),  Cochrane (1994). In one of the many exercises reported 
in his  paper,  Cochrane  (1994) estimates  a VAR over the period  1959 to 
1992 that  includes  quarterly observations  of  the  federal  funds  rate as 
well  as  of  the  logarithms  of  output  and  of  the  price level.9 When  he 
includes  a trend  and  computes  the  monetary  policy  shock by suppos- 
ing  that the  systematic  component  of policy  lets the federal funds  rate 
at t react to output  and the price level at t, he gets very similar impulse 
responses. 
3. A Simple  Model  of Output  and Inflation  Determination 
In this section  we  develop  a simple  equilibrium macroeconomic  model, 
that we  propose  to use  to interpret  the  fluctuations  in  the  three  time 
series  of  our  VAR. The  model  is  extremely  rudimentary;  we  have  re- 
duced  it to  the  essential  elements  necessary  for a general-equilibrium 
account of the determination  of output,  inflation, and interest rates. The 
model  presented  here is intended  more as an illustration of the method 
that we  advocate  than as a complete  model  of the U.S. economy.  None- 
theless,  we  believe  that it shows  that it is  possible  to account  for the 
9. We get very similar  impulse responses  when we consider  a longer  sample  that  is similar 
to his. While the responses of output and inflation  are more muted, we obtain  qualita- 
tively similar  responses if, instead, we start  our sample at the beginning  of 1982.  If the 
VAR  includes only more recent  observations,  the effects of monetary  shocks on output 
and inflation  are much weaker  and more  poorly  determined.  This  is probably  due to the 
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main  features  of  these  time  series  in  terms  of  a model  derived  from 
optimizing  behavior under rational expectations. 
The model  we  use is an extension  of the one used  in Woodford (1996) 
to analyze  the consequences  of interest-rate feedback rules for monetary 
policy,10 with  additional  decision  lags (both for price and quantity vari- 
ables)  added  in  order  to  allow  a better  fit with  the  predictions  of  the 
VAR. The  optimizing  decision  maker in our model  is  an infinite-lived 
representative  household,  which  is both  a consumer  of  all the  goods 
produced  in the economy  and a producer of a single differentiated prod- 
uct. We index each household  by i and let i vary continuously  from zero 
to one.  The objective of household  i, looking forward from date t = 0, is 
to maximize 
Eo  pt[u(Ctvt)  -  v(yt)],  (3.1) 
t=0 
where  p is a discount  factor, yt is the output  of the goods  produced  by 
household  i at time t,  t is a vector of random disturbances,  and for each 
value  of ft, u is an increasing,  concave  function,  and v is an increasing, 
convex  function.l"  The argument  Ct represents  an index  of the  house- 
hold's  purchases  of  all of  the  continuum  of  differentiated  goods  pro- 
duced  in the economy,  given by 
Ci = ((  z )(i)/idz)  (3.2) 
as in  Dixit and  Stiglitz  (1977), where  ct(z) is the quantity  purchased  of 
good  z,  and  the  constant  elasticity  of  substitution  0 is  assumed  to be 
greater than one. 
For expositional  purposes,  it is easiest  to think of these  purchases  by 
the household  as purchases  of nondurable  consumption  goods,  and our 
model  as one  in which  all output  is nondurable  and immediately  con- 
sumed  either by households  or by the government.  If capital goods  are 
used in production,  they are in fixed supply  (and nondepreciating),  and 
their allocation  across  firms (or households)  cannot be changed.  How- 
10. Certain  aspects of the structure  of the model are discussed in more detail there. Note 
that here, unlike in the previous  analysis,  we consider  only the case of a Ricardian  fiscal 
policy,  which allows us to avoid discussion  of certain  equilibrium  conditions  that  play a 
key role in the earlier  paper. 
11. As is discussed further  in Section  4, we can interpret  v as a reduced-form  representa- 
tion of production  costs in a model with firms  and labor  markets.  Under  this interpreta- 
tion, v is convex both because there are diminishing  returns  to labor  and because the 
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ever, we  seek to use the model to explain the dynamics of real GDP, and 
not  just  of  consumption  spending.  Thus  we  actually  interpret  C' as 
referring to the  household's  purchases  of investment  goods  as well  as 
consumption  goods,  and assume  (at the price of an obvious oversimplifi- 
cation)  that  all  such  purchases  are made  to  obtain  immediate  utility, 
which can be expressed  (through a reduced-form or indirect utility func- 
tion)  as  an  increasing,  concave  function  of  total purchases  at a given 
date.  We ignore  the effects of investment  spending  upon  the evolution 
of productive  capacity, in the hope that these effects are in any event not 
too significant  at the frequencies  with which  we  are most concerned  in 
evaluating  alternative  monetary  policies.12 In making  this  simplifying 
assumption,  of course,  we  follow  a long  tradition of macroeconometric 
modeling  based upon more or less elaborate versions  of the textbook IS- 
LM model.13 
Perhaps  the most  surprising  element  of our preference  specification, 
given  that we are interested  in monetary issues,  is that we abstract from 
the liquidity services provided by money. This is no more than a simplifi- 
cation. Our model can be understood  as a the limit of a model where real 
money  balances  provide  utility but where,  in the limit,  these  liquidity 
services are arbitrarily small. Alternatively, the model can be understood 
as one where  utility is additively  separable in real money  balances,  con- 
sumption,  and  goods  supply,  as in Woodford  (1996). In this  case,  the 
model implies an additional first-order condition relating real balances to 
consumption  and  the  interest  rate.  In the  presence  of an interest-rate 
rule, which  is after all the focus  of our analysis,  this additional  equilib- 
rium condition  simply  determines  the nominal level of money  balances. 
Since this equilibrium  condition  plays  no role in determining  inflation, 
output,  or interest rates, it can safely be ignored for our purposes. 
When allocating a given amount of nominal spending  at t, St, across all 
the different differentiated goods,  the household  maximizes (3.2) subject 
to  the  constraint  that  spending  on  all goods  must  not  exceed  S'. This 
leads  to the familiar Dixit-Stiglitz  demand  relations for relative quanti- 
ties purchased as a function of relative prices. As usual, the total expendi- 
ture required to obtain a given  quantity  of the consumption  aggregate 
(3.2)  is  given  by  St =  PtC;, where  Pt is  the  Dixit-Stiglitz  price  index 
defined  by 
1  (3.3)(1- 
Pt=(  pt(z)-  dz)  (3.3) 
12. This will be a subject  of quantitative  investigation  in later  work. 
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The intertemporal  allocation of spending,  in turn, amounts  to choosing 
the path of the aggregate {C} defined  in (3.2) to maximize (3.1) subject to 
a budget  constraint  that is written  in terms of aggregate  consumption 
expenditure. 
We suppose  that there are complete  financial markets14  and no obsta- 
cles to borrowing  against future income,  so that each household  faces a 
single intertemporal budget  constraint. Looking forward from date t, the 
intertemporal budget  constraint of household  i is of the form 
00 
Et  8t,  TST  Et  >  at,T[Pt(i)yt  -  Tt] + A',  (3.4) 
T=t  T=t 
where Ai denotes  the nominal value of the household's  financial assets at 
the  beginning  of  period  t,  Tt denotes  its  net  nominal  (lump  sum)  tax 
obligation  at date t, and  St,T is the stochastic discount  factor that defines 
the nominal  present  value  at t of nominal  income  in any given  state at 
date T :  t. Because of the existence  of complete  financial markets, these 
stochastic  discount  factors are uniquely  defined;  a financial claim to a 
random nominal  quantity Xt at date t has a nominal value of Et(t, TXt).  In 
particular, if Rt denotes  the  (gross)  nominal  interest  rate on  a riskless 
one-period  bond  purchased  in period  t, this interest rate must  satisfy15 
Rt=  (EtA6t,t+)-.  (3.5) 
We assume  that households  must choose their index of purchases C"  at 
date t -  2.16  We interpret this to mean that actions already taken prior to 
14. It is important  to note that by this we mean simply that a household is able to transfer 
purchasing  power  freely  between dates and states of the world, through  the exchange  of 
state-contingent  financial claims. We do not suppose that the state-contingent  ex- 
changes of real  goods and services  that  occur  in our  model  are  contracted  at some initial 
date, as in the Arrow-Debreu  model. Nor do we suppose that households are able to 
arrange  more complicated  sorts of contracts  that would allow them, in effect, to get 
around the constraints  upon price-setting  that we assume to exist in the spot markets 
for goods and services. The state-contingent  financial  claims that we imagine, how- 
ever, do include the possibility  of insuring  oneself against  the idiosyncratic  income  risk 
that households suffer  because they change their  prices  at different  dates. 
15. Other financial  claims can similarly  be priced, but this is the only one that matters  for 
our purposes, as we assume that the central  bank  conducts  monetary  policy  by trading 
in the market  for short-term  nominal  claims  of this kind. 
16. In fact,  we simply  require  that  Ci  be determined  as of the  beginning  of period  t -  1, before 
the monetary  policy  shock  in period  t -  1 is revealed,  but  at  a time  at  which  all  period-t  - 
1 goods transactions  have been determined.  In terms  of our notational  convention,  this 
means that C\  belongs to the date-t -  2 information  set. Note also that  while we require 
that the index Ct  be determined  at date t -  2, the purchases  of individual  goods that  are 
made in order  to achieve  this are determined  only at date t -  1-or  by the beginning  of 
period t-as  these depend upon the period-t  prices  of the individual  goods. Optimization-Based  Econometric  Framework  *  311 
the  realization  of  date-t  -  1 monetary  policy  make  it imperative  that 
certain  purchases  be  made  during  period  t. Certain kinds  of interest- 
sensitive  purchases  do  involve  advance  commitment  of  this  kind;  in 
particular, many  kinds of investment  projects take more than one quar- 
ter to complete,  and abandonment  of the project after initiation may be 
too costly to be contemplated  expect in the case of quite extreme interim 
changes  in market conditions.17 
The household's  optimal program of purchases  then must satisfy 
EtU'(Ct+2;+2)=  Et(At+2,P+2)  (3.6) 
at each  date,  where  A' represents  the  household's  marginal  utility  of 
nominal  income  at date t.18  The marginal utilities of income  at different 
dates and in different states in turn must satisfy 
Ai8t,T =  pT-t~A  (3.7) 
for any T :  t. Conditions  (3.6) and (3.7), and the requirement that (3.4) 
hold  with  equality, completely  determine  the household's  optimal con- 
sumption  plan,  given  its initial wealth,  initial predetermined  consump- 
tion level,  and after-tax income expectations. 
We furthermore assume  that financial markets exist that allow house- 
holds  to  insure  one  another  against  idiosyncratic  income  risk (which 
here  results  solely  from  differences  in  the  time  at which  they  change 
their prices). Assuming  that all households  have identical initial wealth, 
they will choose  in equilibrium to completely  pool their income risk, and 
we  assume  an equilibrium  of this kind.  As  a result,  in equilibrium the 
right-hand  side  of (3.4) has  the  same  value  for each household  at any 
date, and households  choose identical consumption  plans and have iden- 
tical marginal utilities of income.  We can therefore drop the superscripts 
i in equations  (3.6) and (3.7). Note also that it follows from (3.5) and (3.7) 
that the common  marginal utility of income  satisfies 
A, =  'Et(RtAt+l).  (3.8) 
17. Our assumption  thus amounts  to a limiting  case of a time-to-build  model, in which the 
bulk of the expenditure  connected  with a project  initiated  at the beginning  of period  t - 
1 occurs during period t. Note that we could give an information-lag  interpretation  to 
this restriction  upon household purchases:  households choose their overall level of 
purchases in period t with knowledge of period-t -  1 goods-market  conditions, but 
before learning  about period-t -  1 money-market  conditions,  or about  period-t  condi- 
tions in either  goods markets  or money markets. 
18. This quantity  appears  as the Lagrange  multiplier  associated  with constraint  (3.4). It is 
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In our computation  of the equilibrium responses  to shocks  in subse- 
quent  sections,  we  make use  of a log-linear approximation  to the equi- 
librium  conditions  of  our  model,  expanding  in  terms  of  percentage 
deviations  of various  stationary  state variables  from their steady-state 
values  (their  constant  values  in  the  absence  of  all  stochastic  distur- 
bances).  In this log-linear approximation,  (3.8) becomes 
A,  =  Et(Rt-  7it+ +  At+), 
where  At, Rt, and  1Tt denote  percentage  deviations  in the stationary vari- 
ables AtPt,  Rt, and Pt/Pt+ respectively.  (This last definition  makes  sense 
because  we log-linearize  all of our equations  around a steady-state  equi- 
librium in which  the constant  rate of inflation is zero.)  We can further- 
more solve  this forward to obtain 
At  =  r  Et(RI  -  T+1),  (3.9) 
T=t 
where  Pt  defines  percentage  deviations  in a long-run  real rate of return. 
(In all of  the  equilibria that we  analyze  below,  both  interest  rates and 
inflation  follow  stationary  ARMA  processes,  as  a result  of  which  the 
infinite sum in (3.9) converges.) 
The corresponding  log-linear approximation to (3.6) is given by 
-Et(Ct+2  -  Ct+2) =  Etr+2,  (3.10) 
where  the elasticity &r  equals  - u"C/u'  (evaluated  at the steady-state  level 
of  consumption),  (t  indicates  the  percentage  deviation  of  Ct from  its 
steady-state  value,  and  Ct is an exogenous  disturbance  (a certain func- 
tion of the preference  shock  t) indicating  the level  of consumption  re- 
quired  at  each  point  in  time  to  maintain  a certain  constant  marginal 
utility  of  consumption.  Equation  (3.10),  together  with  the  stipulation 
that  t+2  be  determined  at date  t, indicates  how  interest-sensitive  pur- 
chases  in period  t +  2 depend  upon  interest-rate expectations  at date t. 
Total aggregate  demand  is assumed  to be given by 
Yt =  Ct +  Gt,  (3.11) 
where  Gt represents  exogenous  variation  in  autonomous  spending. 
While  one  natural  interpretation  of  Gt is  that it represents  exogenous 
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tions as well.  For instance,  Gt  could represent consumption  purchases by 
liquidity-constrained  consumers,  who spend all their income (as in Camp- 
bell and Mankiw,  1989, except  that we  suppose  that the real income  of 
these  consumers  is an exogenous  random  process,  rather than being  a 
constant fraction of total income).  Because of these various possible inter- 
pretations,  we do not seek to identify Gt  with the government  purchases 
variable in the national  accounts,  any more than we  wish  to identify  Ct 
with consumer  expenditure.  Rather, we focus only on the implications of 
our model  for the evolution  of Yt. Note  that we assume  that Gt is deter- 
mined by the beginning  of period t (i.e.,  that it belongs  to the date-t -  1 
information set), for consistency  with the assumptions  made in our identi- 
fication of the monetary  policy shocks from our VAR in Section 2. 
Log-linearization  of (3.11) yields 
Yt =  SCt  +  G,, 
where  Yt  denotes  percentage  deviations  of Yt  from its steady-state value, 
Gt denotes  the deviation  of Gt from its steady-state  value expressed  as a 
percentage  of the steady-state  value of Y, and sc is the steady-state  value 
of  the  interest-sensitive  share  C/Y. Substituting  this  into  (3.10)  then 
yields  the model's  IS equation 
Yt  =  -Or-Et  2rt +  (t,  (3.12) 
where  o  =  Sca, and  Ct=  Gt +  SCEt-2Ct  is a composite  exogenous  dis- 
turbance.  The aggregate demand block  of our model  then  consists  of the 
monetary policy rule, the term-structure equation (3.9), and the IS equa- 
tion (3.12).19 
We now  turn to our optimizing  model  of price setting  and aggregate 
supply. The decision  problem of price setters depends  upon the demand 
that they  face for their product.  We suppose  that autonomous  expendi- 
ture Gt also  represents  an aggregate  of purchases  of individual  goods, 
and we let this aggregate  have the same form as (3.2), so that 
/  r  1  0\/(0  - 1  ) 
Gt=  gt(z)lFl)/Odz) 
Moreover, we  suppose  that these individual  purchases,  gt(z),  are chosen 
to  maximize  this  aggregate  for  any  given  level  of  expenditure.  As  a 
19. Note that this is the same basic structure  as is used in the small model of Fuhrer  and 
Moore  (1995b).  However,  because  our  IS  equation  is derived  from  intertemporal  optimi- 
zation, there are some differences;  for example, it is the past expectation  of the current 
long-term  real rate that affects current  aggregate  demand, in our specification,  rather 
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result,  these  purchases  are made  in  the  same  proportions  as  those  of 
consumers,  so that the overall demand  faced by an individual  supplier 
satisfies 
-y,  = 
(Y  (3.13) 
As is standard  in models  of monopolistic  competition,  we  assume  that 
an individual  supplier  regards itself as unable to affect the evolution  of 
the variables Yt  and Pt, and so chooses  its own price, taking the evolution 
of those  variables as given. 
The source  of the  real effects  of monetary  policy  in our model  is an 
assumption  of decision  lags in price setting.  Following  Calvo (1983), we 
assume  that prices are changed  at exogenous  random intervals.  Specifi- 
cally, a fraction 1 -  a of sellers get to choose a new price at the beginning 
any  given  period,  whereas  the  others  must  continue  using  their  old 
prices.  Of those  who  get to choose  a new  price, a fraction y start charg- 
ing the new price during that period, whereas the remaining fraction 1 - 
y  must  wait  until  the  next  period  to  charge  the  new  price,  because 
(owing  to a different  organization  of the markets for these  goods)  they 
must  post  their prices  a quarter in advance.  These  assumed  delays  ex- 
plain why  no prices respond  in the quarter of the monetary disturbance 
(as  assumed  in  our  identification  of  the  policy  shocks),  and  why  the 
largest  response  of inflation  to a monetary  shock takes place only  two 
quarters after the shock.20 
Now  let p' denote  the price chosen  by a supplier  that charges  a new 
price beginning  in period  t, if the  new  price is chosen  on  the basis  of 
period-t  -  i information  (for i =  1,2). (The price chosen  by all suppliers 
that choose  on the basis of the same information set will be the same.) It 
then  follows  from (3.3) that the  price index  Pt will evolve  according  to 
Pt =  [aP}-  +  (1  -  a)y(p])'-  +  (1  -  a)(1  -  y))(p  )l-  ]l/(l-0) 
Dividing  both sides by Pt and log-linearizing,  we obtain 
Wt  =  yX] +  (1 -  y)t,  (3.14), 
where  ft  -  [(l-a)/a]  log  (P/Pt) for  i  =  1,2.  Thus  the  overall  rate of 
inflation  depends  upon  the relative prices of the two types  of suppliers 
with new  prices in a given  period. 
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The  optimal  value  of p', in  turn,  will  be  the  price p that maximizes 
Et_jit(p), where 
t(p)  P  [At+j  (1-  r)pYt+  ( 
P 
'-V  (  Yt+j  ( 
P  );  t+j  )  1, 
j=0o  t+j  t+j 
and T is a constant  tax rate that we  assume  the government  levies  upon 
sales of output.  The first-order condition  for this optimization problem is 
given  by 
Et-it(Pt)  =  0.  (3.15) 
When  these  relations  are log-linearized  for i =  1,2, one  finds that they 
imply that (up to a log-linear approximation) log p2  is equal to the condi- 
tional expectation  at t -  2 of log pl. It follows  that 
1 a-a 
Xt =  EtXt  -  (t-  Et-2't).  a 
Equation (3.14) then implies  that 
'TT=  Xt +  Et-2,t,  (3.16)  1+  I  l+qt 
where  i  =  (1 -  y)/ya,  and where we now  simply write Xt for Xk.  Thus it 
suffices  that we  discuss  the determination  of p', and hence  of X. 
Log-linearizing  (3.15) for i = 1 around a zero-inflation steady state, we 
obtain 
E  (aPy[ [(1  +  )(1 
a  -  ) 
j=o  s=1 
-  (O  +  c)(Y+  - 
Yt+j)]  -t-,  (3.17) 
where  o equals v"'Y/v'  (evaluated  at the steady-state  level of output), 
4t 
-  Et[g  t+l  -  ~  t+2  +2  -  Yt+1  +  (t+l)], 
-  cr 
yts  E_t-lY+  c, 
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and Yt is an exogenous  disturbance  (a certain function of the preference 
shock  t) that indicates the level of supply at each point in time required to 
maintain a certain constant  marginal disutility of supply. Equation (3.17) 
says that, except for a term involving  the real interest rates at t, the price 
charged  by  a firm that  has  an  opportunity  to  change  its  price  at  t is 
proportional  to a present  discounted  value  of marginal costs.  Marginal 
cost equals  the price level  plus a correction that depends  on the level of 
aggregate activity, and must also be corrected for exogenous  supply distur- 
bances,  represented  by  E.21 A  high  level  of  the  real interest  rate at t 
relative to the expected growth rate of consumption  from t to t + 1 reduces 
the  price charged  at t. Such  a high  real rate implies  that the  revenues 
generated  from reductions  in prices  are actually more valuable  than is 
implied by the current level of output.  The reason for this is that the need 
to set consumption  in advance implies that the current consumption  is not 
a perfect indicator of the marginal utility of income.  Rather, a high real 
interest rate relative to the rate of growth of consumption  from t to t +  1 
implies  that the marginal utility of income is relatively high at t, because 
people would,  if they could, raise the current marginal utility of consump- 
tion by postponing  some  of their current consumption. 
Quasidifferencing  (3.17), along the lines of the derivation in Woodford 
(1996), leads to 
A  A1I  K 
Xt =  iEt-lXt+l +  K(Yt 
-  Y)  -  ti  (3.18) 
where 
(1(1  -  )(  -  ap)(w  + a) 
K  - 
a(1  +  cO) 
The aggregate supply block  of our model  then consists  of equations  (3.16) 
and (3.18). 
Note  that if we  take conditional  expectations  of both (3.16) and (3.18) 
at date t -  2, we  obtain simply 
Et-2rt  =  KEt-2(Yt  -  Y)  +  PEt-27t+1. 
21. We have defined Y'  in terms  of the supply disturbances  affecting  marginal  cost at t that 
can be forecast on the basis of period-t -  1 information,  because only these distur- 
bances affect pricing decisions, given that all period-t prices are set on the basis of 
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This  is  identical,  in  conditional  expectation,  to  the  form  of  aggregate 
supply  equation  obtained  from  models  such  as  those  of  Rotemberg 
(1982) and  Calvo  (1983), called by Roberts (1995) "the New  Keynesian 
Phillips  Curve."  In this expectations-augmented  Phillips curve,  the ex- 
ogenous  disturbance  Yt plays  the role of a "natural" rate of output  for 
period t. Our aggregate supply relations here have the same implications 
as  regards  the  relation  that  must  exist  between  inflation  and  output 
fluctuations  that  can  be  forecast  sufficiently  far in  advance;  but  they 
allow  for a more flexible short-run relationship,  due to the existence  of 
additional  decision  lags beyond  those  present  in the simplest  discrete- 
time version  of the Calvo model. 
4.  Estimation  of Model  Parameters 
We now  have  a complete  model  of the  determination  of output,  infla- 
tion,  and  interest  rates, which  consists  of equations  (2.1),  (3.9),  (3.12), 
(3.16) and (3.18). Apart from the coefficients  of the monetary policy rule 
(2.1), the estimation  of which we have discussed  in the previous  section, 
and the parameters specifying  the stochastic processes for the real distur- 
bances,  which  we  consider  in the following  section,  the model involves 
six parameters,  the structural parameters a,  8,  y, a,  0, and  o. Here we 
consider  the  estimation  of these  parameters  so as to make the model's 
predictions  regarding  the  effects  of  a monetary  policy  shock  fit those 
estimated  by the unrestricted VAR (and shown  in Figure 1) as closely as 
possible. 
Before  proceeding  further,  it  is  perhaps  worthwhile  to  comment 
briefly  on  our estimation  strategy. We wish  to estimate  the  model  pa- 
rameters so as to match theoretical with  measured  second  moments  of 
our three time series. The second moments  of the data can be completely 
summarized  by  (1) the  variances  of the three orthogonal  VAR innova- 
tions,  and  (2) the  impulse  response  functions  of the  three variables to 
each of the three orthogonal  innovations.22 Obviously, we can match the 
observed  variances  of  the  three  innovations  by  choosing  appropriate 
variances for the exogenous  disturbances in our model.  We show  in the 
next  section  that we  can also  completely  match the estimated  impulse 
responses  of all three variables to the two innovations  that are orthogo- 
nal to the identified  monetary  policy  shock by appropriately specifying 
the  stochastic  processes  of  the  "real" disturbances.  This possibility  is 
furthermore completely  independent  of the values we may have assigned 
22. Note  that  the  possibility  of  describing  the  data in  this  way  does  not  depend  upon 
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to the structural parameters,  though  it depends  upon our use of OLS to 
estimate  the parameters  of the monetary  policy rule. We do indeed  ob- 
tain  the  monetary  rule  in  this  way;  we  use  the  estimates  in  the  first 
column of Table 1 with the coefficients on output divided by 4 so that the 
estimates  are identical  to those  we  would  have  obtained  if we  had not 
annualized  our interest  rate and inflation series.  Given this way  of esti- 
mating  the monetary  policy  rule,  the only features of the data that pro- 
vide  any  information  about  the  structural parameters  are the  impulse 
responses  to the monetary  policy  shock,  shown  in Figure 1.23  It follows 
that it is appropriate  to estimate  these  parameters  so as to fit the esti- 
mated impulse  response  functions. 
We now  discuss  the extent  to which  the structural parameters can be 
identified  from the impulse  responses.  In fact, they are not all identified. 
Note  first that  0 appears  only  in  (3.18),  where  it matters  only  for the 
determination  of  K. We may  thus  propose  to estimate  K rather than  6. 
With this change  of variables,  neither  a nor y appears except in (3.16), 
where  they matter only  through  their effect upon  the ratio  =  (1 -  y)/ 
ya.  Thus the identified  parameters are at most the five parameters /3, K, 
or,  c), and  ir. 
In fact,  one  can  show  that only  four combinations  of  the  structural 
parameters can be identified  from the impulse  responses  to a monetary 
policy  shock,  given  a particular feedback  rule for the monetary  policy. 
The parameters  3, K, and  -  are each identified,  but only a single function 
of  co and  i  is,  rather  than  either  of  these  being  identified  indepen- 
dently.24  While the impulse  responses  do not fully identify q, they can be 
used  to put a lower bound  on it (given the possible  range of variation in 
c).  Thus our introduction  of a subset  of producers who  must determine 
price changes  two quarters in advance (corresponding  to y <  1, so that  f 
is  strictly  positive)  does  allow  us  to  better  fit  the  estimated  impulse 
responses,  even  if the parameter y cannot be identified. 
The reason that, for a given  K, ii and w cannot be identified  separately 
from  the  impulse  response  function  is  the  following.  The  effect  of  a 
monetary  shock  at t on  the  expected  evolution  of prices,  output,  and 
23. For clarity of presentation,  these  are displayed  once  again using  annualized  inflation 
and interest  rates,  even  though  the equations  of the model  involve  quarterly interest 
and inflation rates. 
24. The particular  combination  of parameters  that matters  for the impulse responses de- 
pends on the coefficients  of the monetary  policy  rule. Thus  both w and q matter  for  the 
model's predictions  regarding  the consequences  of alternative  monetary  policy  rules- 
they even matter for the model's predictions  regarding  the effects of monetary  policy 
shocks  under alternative  regimes. However, if we only observe the impulse responses 
under a single  policy regime, we are unable  to disentangle  the two parameters  without 
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inflation  starting from their position  at t +  1 is independent  of  /, and  o. 
The reason is that for k  -  1 the expectation  at t of  t+k, is zero (so that w 
does  not affect the dynamic  equations  for periods  beyond  t +  1), while 
the expectation at t of  't+k+1 is equal to the expectation at t of Et+k_  iit+k+l  (so 
that  if does  not  affect  the  dynamic  equations  beyond  t  +  1).  So  the 
parameters  i and w matter only for determining  the response  of inflation 
at t +  1 (since output at t + 1 is predetermined).  But the response  of just 
one variable at t +  1 cannot separately identify two parameters. 
The  complete  set  of  parameters  can thus  be  determined  only  if we 
introduce  additional  considerations.  We propose  to calibrate two  of the 
unidentified  parameters on the basis of independent  evidence,  allowing 
us  to  estimate  the  remaining  parameters  from the  impulse  responses. 
One  parameter we  calibrate is a,  which  determines  how  frequently  on 
average  a producer  changes  his  or her price.  Given  our assumed  con- 
straints upon  price setting,  our model implies  that the mean time that a 
given  price remains in effect is 1/(1 -  a) quarters. We can thus choose  a 
plausible  value  for this parameter based  upon  microeconomic  evidence 
regarding  the average length  of time individual  prices remain in effect. 
Unfortunately,  different  studies  of individual  price adjustment  report 
different  estimates  for this  average  length.  At  one  extreme,  Cecchetti 
(1986) reports that the newsstand  prices of magazines  stay constant  for 
between  1.8 and 14 years.  At the other, Dutta, Bergen, and Levy (1995) 
report that the price of orange juice at supermarkets  stays constant  for 
between  2 and 10 weeks.  The findings  of Carlton (1986), Blinder (1994), 
and  Kashyap  (1995) fall somewhere  in between.  Carlton (1986) shows 
that, depending  on the product, prices are constant for between  4 and 13 
months.  Blinder (1994) reports that his interviewees  kept prices constant 
for an average  of 9 months.25 Finally, Kashyap (1995) shows  that prod- 
ucts from the L. L. Bean catalogue keep their prices constant for between 
11 and  30 months.  This  diversity  of findings  leads  us  to use  Blinder's 
(1994) estimate  both because  it is relatively conservative  and because  it 
covers  a broad range of industries.  The result is that 1/(1 -  a) equals 3 
quarters, so that a equals 0.66. 
We can also calibrate w on the basis of data regarding labor costs. Note 
that this parameter gives  the elasticity of the marginal disutility  of pro- 
ducing  output  with  respect  to an increase  in output.  It is thus  closely 
related to the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output.  To relate 
this  parameter to measures  of labor costs,  we  may further specify  that 
25. In his Table  4.1, he reports  the fraction  of his respondents  for whom the frequency  of 
price adjustment  falls between various threshold levels. We had to make somewhat 
arbitrary  assumptions  to convert  these frequency  categories  into mean lengths of con- 
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output  is produced  via a production  function  Y = f(H), where  H repre- 
sents  hours  worked,  and  that  the  representative  household  has  a 
disutility  of working  given  by g(H), so that v(Y) is equal to g(f-(Y)).  The 
equivalence  with  our earlier formulation is direct if the household  uses 
its  own  hours  in  order to produce,  as in the  standard yeoman-farmer 
model.  However,  the same equilibrium conditions  for output and prices 
are obtained  if we  assume  that output  is actually sold by firms that hire 
labor in a competitive  labor market.26  In this case, the model  also deter- 
mines  the equilibrium wages  in each segmented  labor market. 
This specification  implies  that v' = g'/f',  as a result of which 
v"Y  ("H  f"H)f  L 
@ i  v7Y =  (8,  -  ft  ) ftH  (4.1)  '?-v'  f  g'  f'H 
Wage-taking behavior by households  implies that the wage in labor mar- 
ket  i must  satisfy  w' =  g'(H)/u'(C).  Log-linearizing  around  the  steady- 
state values  of the state variables, and aggregating across labor markets, 
this yields 
g"H  f 
g'  f'H 
where g"H/g' is the reciprocal of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply  with 
respect to the real wage,  and E,y  is the elasticity of the average real wage 
with respect to variation in Y, in the case of variations in output that are 
not  associated  with  shifts  in preferences  or technology.  Various instru- 
ments  for such  changes  in  economic  activity are possible.  Christiano, 
Eichenbaum,  and Evans (1996) show,  using  a structural VAR to identify 
monetary  policy  shocks,  that an increase  in the federal funds  rate that 
leads  to a 0.4% reduction  in output  reduces  real wages  by about 0.1%, 
suggesting  an elasticity  of 0.25.  Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) use  a 
VAR to study  the effects of oil price increases,  and find that an oil shock 
that lowers  output  by about 0.25% lowers  real wages  by 0.1%, suggest- 
ing an elasticity of 0.4. Given this range of estimates,  we set Ewy  = 0.3.27 
26. It is necessary,  under this interpretation,  to assume that the firms that sell goods the 
prices of which are chosen at different  dates also hire from distinct  labor  markets,  so 
that their  wages need not move together  despite competition  in each of the segmented 
labor  markets.  This is not inconsistent  with the assumption  of competition,  since there 
might be several firms at each "location"  that share a local labor  market  and that all 
change their  prices at the same time. 
27. Note that this elasticity  of the real wage with respect  to variations  in aggregate  output 
agrees  with that measured  by Solon, Barsky,  and Parker  (1994),  who do not instrument 
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Finally, assuming  an isoelastic  (Cobb-Douglas)  production  function, 
with an elasticity of output with respect to hours worked given by 17,  one 
finds that -f"f/(f')2  = (1 -  ~)/.  Price-taking behavior on the part of firms 
implies  furthermore  that the  wage  in labor market i must  satisfy  w  = 
f'(Hi).  It follows  from this that the share of wages  in the value of output 
in that sector should  equal  r//Ii,  where  /i  is the gross  markup of price 
over marginal cost in sector i (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997a). If mark- 
ups  are on  average  modest  in  size,  then  the value  of  q should  not be 
much  larger than the average labor share. We accordingly set r1  =  0.75, 
implying  that -f"f/(f')2  = 0.33. Substituting this, we find that w = 0.63 - 
or.  This restriction is imposed  in our estimation of the values of these two 
parameters. 
The parameter P is calibrated as well,  not because it is not identifiable 
from the impulse  responses,  but because  it is identifiable more directly 
from first moments  of our data, and thus cannot plausibly be treated as a 
free parameter when  trying to fit the second  moments.  Our model  im- 
plies that P-'  should  equal the gross real rate of return. Since this equals 
approximately  1.01 on average,  we set 13  equal to 0.99. 
We then  choose  values  for our remaining three structural parameters, 
K,  a,  and  b, to ensure  that the theoretical impulse  responses  are as close 
as possible  to the empirical ones.  We focus on the responses  in the first 
four  quarters  after  the  shock,  on  the  ground  that  we  have  the  most 
confidence  in the estimated impulse  responses  for the first year, and that 
it is only for these  initial responses  that we can reject the hypothesis  that 
monetary  policy  shocks  are irrelevant for our three variables.  We thus 
choose  the  theoretical  parameters  that  minimize  the  sum  of  squared 
differences  between  the theoretical and empirical impulse  responses  of 
output,  inflation,  and interest rates for quarters 0 through 4 following  a 
monetary policy shock. In this optimization,  we give equal weight  to the 
three discrepancies  that are depicted  in Figure 1. 
The parameters  that minimize  this criterion function are K =  0.024, ac 
=  0.16,  and  r =  0.88,  which  in turn imply  y =  0.63, ol =  0.47, and 0 = 
7.88.  With  the  possible  exception  of  o,  these  parameter values  are all 
fairly plausible.28 The  estimate  of  1/cr is  substantially  greater than  the 
intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  typically  found  in the  literature 
that  analyzes  nondurable  consumption  purchases.  However,  our esti- 
mate of 1/o indicates the elasticity of expected output growth with respect 
to  the  expected  real return.  Thus,  we  should  expect  a lower  a  in our 
28. The plausibility  of these  parameters  runs counter  to the  suggestion  of Chari, Kehoe, 
and  McGrattan (1996) that models  of this  type  are unable  to reproduce  the empirical 
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model  since  the  purchases  of both  consumer  durables  and investment 
goods  are likely to be more interest-sensitive. 
We can use  (4.1) together  with our estimate of  o to obtain an estimate 
of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Given that our assumptions  imply 
that -f"f/(f')2 is equal to 0.33, the resulting Frisch elasticity is 9.5. This is 
certainly higher  than the estimates  obtained  from microeconomic  stud- 
ies such as Pencavel (1986) and Card (1994). It is important to stress that 
this high  labor supply  elasticity is not necessary  to match the empirical 
responses  of the three series we have focused  on. We could alternatively 
have  imposed  a Frisch elasticity of only  1.0, and still have obtained  the 
same theoretical responses  for our series, by maintaining the same a and 
K.  The parameter w)  would  then have to equal 1.66, while  y and 0 would 
be 0.71, and 7.61 respectively.  Our reason for preferring the higher labor 
supply  elasticity is that it rationalizes the weak observed response  of real 
wages  to a monetary  disturbance.  At the  same  time,  we  recognize  the 
need  for more research to reconcile the macroeconomic  response  of real 
wages  with  the  microeconomic  evidence  concerning  household  labor 
supply. 
Finally,  the  estimated  elasticity  0 of  the  demand  curve  faced  by  a 
typical  supplier  is quite plausible.  It implies  a degree  of market power 
that results in prices being set at a level 15%  higher than marginal cost on 
average.  The estimated  elasticity of demand  is thus neither so low as to 
imply implausibly  large markups,  nor so high as to make it implausible 
for firms to stagger their price adjustments. 
In addition  to displaying  the empirical impulse  responses  to a mone- 
tary policy  shock  together  with  their confidence  bands,  Figure  1 also 
gives  the theoretical responses  corresponding  to our estimated  parame- 
ter values.  (In each panel,  the theoretical response  is the solid line, while 
the estimated  response  is the middle  dashed  line.)  As this figure indi- 
cates,  the  theoretical  responses  of output  and interest  rates match  the 
estimated  responses  very closely. In particular, it is worth noting that our 
model  accounts  for both the magnitude  and the degree of persistence  of 
the effects on output  of such a shock. 
Our ability to match the output  response  may seem  surprising given 
that the nominal  interest rate has essentially  returned to its steady-state 
value  by  the  time  output  finally  falls.  However,  the  positive  shock  to 
interest rates lowers  inflation and, as a result, raises the real interest rate 
for some time. This makes the output fall consistent  with the IS equation 
(3.12).  Because  the increase  in real interest  rates is small relative to the 
fall in output,  the value of cr  that rationalizes these relative movements  is 
also small. 
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Subsequently,  inflation  reverts more quickly to its mean in the theoreti- 
cal response,  whereas  the estimated  response  of inflation is much more 
protracted, if one can believe the point estimates.  The problem is reminis- 
cent  of  the  criticism  of  the  Taylor (1980) model  of  overlapping  wage 
contracts  by  Fuhrer and  Moore  (1995a) as  unable  to  explain  inflation 
persistence.  However,  the  confidence  intervals  indicate  that  the  re- 
sponse  of inflation  is very poorly  estimated  in our sample,  so that it is 
difficult to say that the data reject this aspect  of the predictions  of our 
model. 
It is also worth remembering  that the predictions of our model on this 
score (as on others) are themselves  uncertain. In particular, they depend 
on  the  estimated  coefficients  of  the  monetary  policy  rule,  which  can 
hardly be estimated  with  great precision.  Our method,  which  has esti- 
mated  the  monetary  policy  rule without  any  reference  to the  implica- 
tions  of  the  coefficients  of  this  rule  for  the  nature  of  the  theoretical 
impulse  responses  of output and inflation to a monetary shock, makes it 
particularly unlikely  that the  theoretical  impulse  responses  will  match 
the unrestricted VAR estimates.  A joint estimation strategy (in which the 
coefficients  of the  policy  rule and  the  structural parameters are jointly 
chosen  so  as  to  match  theoretical  with  estimated  impulse  responses) 
might well improve  the fit of the impulse  response  of inflation. 
5. Identification  of Shock  Processes 
In this  section,  we  construct  time series  for the three stochastic  distur- 
bances  Et, Ct,  and  YA. We further show  how  the VAR can be used to infer 
the  stochastic  process  that generates  these  variables.  Finally, we  show 
how  to construct the response  of our three endogenous  variables to the 
shock  processes  for any  given  monetary  policy  rule.  This allows  us  to 
construct  counterfactual  histories  that,  according  to our model,  would 
have taken place if the monetary authority had followed  a different rule. 
Note  first that (2.3) can be premultiplied  by T-' to yield 
Zt =  BZt_1 +  Ue,,  (5.1) 
where  the  matrix  U consists  of  zeros  except  that its  upper  left 3-by-3 
block  consists  of a lower  triangular matrix with  ones  on  the  diagonal. 
Letting in denote  the vector whose  nth element  is a one and whose  other 
elements  are  zero,  the  historical  time  series  for  the  monetary  policy 
shock  Et  can be derived  from the relation 
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We denote  by Zt  the vector whose  elements  are the model's  theoretical 
predictions  concerning  the elements  of Zt, the vector of historical time 
series.  (The need  for separate notation will become clear when  we intro- 
duce  our simulation  method;  we  will then  distinguish  between  the his- 
torical law  of motion  of Zt and  the  theoretical  law  of motion  of Zt.)  The 
structural  equations  of  the  previous  section,  (3.9),  (3.12),  (3.16),  and 
(3.18), can be written in terms of the Z's as 
M'7t 
-  N'  Et-lZt+ji  =  t+l,  (5.3) 
j=l 
P'E,Zt  +  R'EtZt+  =  Y+  +  Et(Gt+2-  t+l)  (5.4) 
(J+  ( 
Here (5.3) is obtained  from (3.12) by substituting  (3.9) to eliminate Pt  and 
recalling  that,  according  to the model,  Y'+, and  ^t,+ are in the period-t 
information  set.  Similarly, (5.4)  is  obtained  by  substituting  (3.16) into 
(3.18) to eliminate  the  X variables.  Note  also  that the  time  subscript is 
increased  by one in both equations,  so that the right-hand  sides  of both 
equations  represent  exogenous  shocks in period t. 
Assuming  that the VAR correctly captures  the stochastic  process  fol- 
lowed by the variables in Zt, one can thus reconstruct the time series for Ct 
and YA by assuming  that agents' expectations  coincide with the VAR fore- 
casts.29  For instance,  this implies that, under the policy regime that gener- 
ates the historical data, agents' forecasts Et_1Zt  are equal to BZ,_ . It then 
follows  that we  can reconstruct historical time series for Ct and Yt using 
St  [t+,,  Yt+11  = CZt  +  Det,  (5.5) 
r[  M'  -  N'B(I-  B)-1  1 
L  P'  + R'B -,,,  [N'B -  M'(I  -  B)] 
c =  +  ~1B,Ml 
D 
[R'B  +-  [M'(I-  B) +N'B2(  -  B)1]  U. 
These  series are exogenous  according to our model,  so their realizations 
can be held  fixed in simulations  of counterfactual history under alterna- 
tive policy regimes. 
29. In inferring our shock series from the residuals  of our structural equations,  we extend 
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Because  our model  involves  forward-looking  behavior,  such  simula- 
tions also require that we specify agents' beliefs regarding the stochastic 
processes  generating  the shock series. Given our proposed  identification 
of the shock series,  there is an obvious  model-consistent  specification of 
such beliefs: agents  regard the vector of shocks st, from some period t = 
1 onward,  as being  generated  by (5.5), together with  the law of motion 
(5.1)  for  the  stochastic  process  Zt,  given  a  specification  of  the  initial 
condition  ZO  and  the  distribution  from which  the  white-noise  innova- 
tions et are drawn each period. 
A  complete  simulation  model  would  therefore  consist  of  a  speci- 
fication  of  a  monetary  policy  rule  of  the  form  (2.1),  together  with  a 
specified  distribution  for the  monetary  policy  shocks  Et;  the  structural 
equations  (5.3)-(5.4);  and  the  law  of  motion  for the  real disturbances 
given  by (5.1) and  (5.5), together  with  the distribution of the shocks  et. 
Such  a  model  would  determine  the  evolution  of  {Zt,Zt,st}  given  initial 
conditions  {Z0,  E0Z,Z0}  and  the  white-noise  shocks  {Et,et}. The  model 
could be used  to simulate counterfactual history if we supply  the histori- 
cal  shock  series  (computed  above)  for  {Et,t'}.  In  such  a simulation,  it is 
natural to specify  initial conditions  ZO  =  ZO  and EoZ, =  BZ0, where  ZO 
represents  the  historical  data  for the  period  immediately  prior to  the 
beginning  of the simulation.30 The simulation model can also be used  to 
generate  predictions  about  second  moments  of  the  elements  of  Zt,  in 
the  stationary  equilibrium  associated  with  an  arbitrary policy  regime, 
by  taking  expectations  over  the  distribution  of possible  realizations  of 
the shocks. 
This  method  of  simulation  would  have  the  property  that,  if the  as- 
sumed  monetary  policy  rule  is  the  estimated  historical  one,  and  one 
feeds  in the constructed  historical shock series,  the predicted  series {ZJt 
coincides  exactly with the historical data series {Z}.  Thus this method  of 
identification  of  the  shocks  would  allow  a complete  reconstruction  of 
the historical data as the unfolding  of a stationary rational expectations 
equilibrium.  The intuition  for this result is straightforward.  Use  of the 
monetary  policy  rule implied  by the VAR ensures  that we  can perfectly 
reconstruct  the behavior  of interest  rates as long  as we  are also able to 
match  the  behavior  of  output  and  inflation.  Moreover,  the  proposed 
method  for constructing  Ct and Yt ensures  that, when  current and past 
30. This specification  of initial conditions makes sense if we assume that the stationary 
equilibrium  that results  in the law of motion  indicated  by the VAR  has been in effect  up 
through  period  zero, and has been in effect  long enough for all of the elements of ZO  to 
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values  of output  and inflation are equal to their actual values,  the model 
is consistent  with  the VAR's predictions  concerning  future movements 
in these  variables.  Thus,  as long  as we  start from an initial condition  in 
which  the  model  and  the  data  agree,  we  are  able  to  rationalize  the 
evolution  of all three series. 
It is important  to  stress  that this  ability to reconstruct  the  historical 
series  does  not  imply  that our structural model  is correct. Indeed,  we 
would  be able to reconstruct the historical series of output,  inflation, and 
interest rates in the way described even for arbitrary values of the struc- 
tural parameters.  The model  does,  however,  have  testable  predictions 
(which is what allows  us to identify  several of the structural parameters 
from moments  of the data). Specifically, the identified  monetary  policy 
shock process  et should  be orthogonal  to the real disturbances  Ct and Ys 
at all leads and lags. This restriction is not imposed  in the above method 
of identification  of the  historical  shock  series.  (In fact, the constructed 
historical  shocks  have  the  property  that  elt  =  Et in  every  period.31)  One 
can avoid this problem in the case of the stochastic simulation model,  by 
assuming  that  elt  and  Et are  independent  random  variables,  though 
drawn from identical distributions.  But the resulting model  of the data- 
generating  process  is still subject to an internal inconsistency,  in that if 
the model  is true, it should  not be possible  to identify the four indepen- 
dent shocks  Et, e,t,  e2, and e3t from a three-variable VAR of the kind that 
we use. 
This inconsistency  can be eliminated  by modifying  the above  proce- 
dure  for identification  of  the  shocks.  Specifically, we  assume  that  the 
real disturbances  st are generated  by the laws  of motion  (5.1) and (5.5), 
but we  assume  that in these  equations  eFt =  0 at all times,  whereas  e2t 
and  e3t are again  assumed  to be  white-noise  random  terms,  indepen- 
dent of each other and of the monetary  shocks,  and drawn each period 
from distributions  identical  to those  of the corresponding  VAR residu- 
als. This alternative stochastic simulation model has only three indepen- 
dent  exogenous  disturbances  each  period  (two  "real" shocks  and  the 
monetary  policy  shock).  Under  the  assumption  that  such  a model  is 
correct,  analysis  of  the  VAR according  to our method  should  (at least 
asymptotically)  recover exactly the true stochastic processes  generating 
the various  shocks. 
Correspondingly,  for  purposes  of  counterfactual  historical  simula- 
31. This implies  that constructed  real and monetary shock series are not orthogonal,  unless 
the matrices in (5.1) and (5.5) happen  to imply that the shocks ,t  have no effect upon st. 
This  is  in  fact  not  the  case  for our  estimated  model,  for otherwise  the  theoretical 
impulse  responses  to a monetary  shock would  perfectly match those  estimated  using 
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tions,  we  do not construct the historical shock series by substituting  the 
historical data Zt-_ and VAR residuals  et into (5.5). Instead,  we  use  the 
historical  VAR residuals  e2t and  e3t, but  set  elt =  0 in all periods,  and 
then  simulate  (5.1),  starting  from an  initial Z0 given  by  the  historical 
data,  to generate  a modified  sequence  {Zt}.  These  modified  Z_t- and et 
are then  substituted  into  (5.5)  to  construct  the  historical  sequence  of 
real disturbances.  The method  thus amounts  to using  not the residuals 
of  the  structural  equations  (5.3)-(5.4),  but  rather  the  component  of 
those  residuals  that  is  orthogonal  to  the  identified  monetary  policy 
shock  and  to  all its  lags.  With this  modification,  the  simulated  paths 
using  the  estimated  monetary  policy  rule no  longer  need  to equal the 
actual  paths.  The  extent  to  which  the  simulated  data track the  actual 
data  then  becomes  a test  of  the  accuracy of  our  structural model.  As 
we  show  in  the  next  section,  our  estimated  model  (with  historical 
shock  series  constructed  in the  way  just  described)  does  quite a good 
job  of  accounting  for  the  variations  in  real  GDP, inflation,  and  the 
Federal  funds  rate  since  1980,  despite  the  specification  error that  is 
indicated  by  its  failure  to  perfectly  match  the  estimated  impulse  re- 
sponses  in Figure 1. 
Another  way  of assessing  the degree  of correspondence  between  our 
model  and  the  U.S.  data is  to compare  the  empirical auto-  and  cross- 
correlation functions  for our three series with the corresponding  predic- 
tions  of the  stochastic  simulation  model,  with  the  stochastic  processes 
for the shocks  specified  as above.  This comparison is shown  in Figure 2, 
where  in each of the nine panels,  the solid line indicates the theoretical 
cross-correlation function,  and the dashed line the cross-correlation func- 
tion implied by the unrestricted VAR characterization of the U.S. data. It 
is clear that our model  accounts  for the second  moments  of the data to 
essentially  the same degree  as does  the unrestricted VAR. Among  other 
things,  our model is able to perfectly reproduce the degree of persistence 
of  inflation  despite  the  criticism  of  a Taylor-style model  of  staggered 
price setting  on this score by Fuhrer and Moore (1995a). It is also able to 
match  the  negative  correlation of output  with  lagged  nominal  interest 
rates that King and Watson (1996) find cannot be explained  by an opti- 
mizing  model  with  Calvo-style  staggered  price  setting  similar  to  our 
own.  Fuhrer (1997b) also draws attention to this correlation and suggests 
that a "backwards looking" IS curve is needed  to explain it. We suspect 
that some  of the difficulties  faced by these  previous  authors in reconcil- 
ing models  of optimizing  consumers  and of staggered price setting with 
these  features  of the data may relate to the imposition  of a priori restric- 
tions upon the exogenous  shock processes,  for which there is no theoreti- 
cal justification. 328 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
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6.  Simulation  of  Alternative  Monetary  Policy  Rules 
In this section  we briefly illustrate how  the simulation  model built up in 
the  previous  two  sections  can be  used  to predict  the  consequences  of 
alternative  possible  monetary  policy  rules  of  the  form  (2.1).  We first 
display  in Figure 3 the consequences  of a feedback rule with  the coeffi- 
cients of the estimated  historical policy rule. In each panel of this figure, 
the dashed  line represents  the actual data for the series in question,  the 
solid line represents  the simulation  of our model assuming  the historical 
sequence  of monetary policy shocks as well as the historical series for the 
real shocks,  and the dash-dot  line represents  a simulation  in which  the 
historical feedback rule for the funds rate is followed,  but with the mone- 
tary policy shocks  Et set equal to zero. 
One  observes,  first,  that  the  first two  plots  track one  another  quite 
closely  in each panel.  Thus our model  does  quite well at accounting  for 
the historical paths  of output,  inflation,  and the funds  rate, despite  the 
fact that the theoretical and estimated  impulse  responses  to a monetary 
shock  do not perfectly  coincide.  The only very noticeable  failure of our 
simulation  model  is in tracking the level of inflation from 1993 onward. 
The dash-dot  line differs somewhat  more from the solid line; this indi- 
cates the consequences,  according to our model,  of the random  distur- 
bances  to monetary  policy. Monetary policy  shocks  clearly have played 
some role; in particular, our simulations  indicate that unexpectedly  tight 
monetary  policy  in  early  1982 deepened  the  1982 recession,  and  that 
unexpectedly  loose  policy  stimulated  real activity in  the  period  1992- 
1993. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  simulations  imply  that relatively little of the 
variability in output  or inflation  in this period  can be attributed to the 
monetary  policy shocks.  Table 2 shows  this in a different way by report- 
ing the predicted  stationary variances of interest rates, output,  and infla- 
tion under a variety of alternative policy rules. The first two rows of the 
table give these  statistics for two regimes corresponding  to the estimated 
feedback  rule with  and without  the stochastic term. Comparison  of the 
numbers in these two rows shows  that, in the simulation of the historical 
policy regime,  the monetary policy shocks are responsible,  over the long 
run,  for  only  5.0%  of  the  variance  of  deviations  of  real output  from 
trend,  and (perhaps  more surprisingly)  for only  1.3% of the variance of 
inflation. 
But these  results  do  not imply  that monetary  policy  is unimportant. 
Nor do they necessarily  absolve  the Fed from any blame for the instabil- 
ity of output  or inflation.  What they mean is that it is the systematic  part 
of recent  monetary  policy  that has  been  of significance  for recent  eco- 330 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
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Table  2  VARIANCES  OF OUTPUT,  INFLATION,  AND INTEREST  RATES 
UNDER  DIFFERENT  MONETARY  RULES 
Loss  from 
Var  Var  variability 
Policy  Var  R  Var  Y  Var  Ir  (Ir-Er)  E(Y  -  YS)  (L) 
Historical:  with shocks  7.64  4.79  2.28  0.66  12.14  3.43 
without shocks  6.73  4.55  2.25  0.65  11.89  3.39 
=  1.5, 0y = 0.5  17.14  3.87  7.34  0.81  13.86  8.72 
, =  1,  y  = 5  22.95  0.51  6.45  0.91  17.84  8.10 
0r =  10,  = 0  30.11  12.61  0.30  0.25  4.58  0.74 
Minimum-L  732.89  18.77  0  0  0  0 
Constrained-optimal  1.93  11.30  0.39  0.20  7.57  0.93 
Note: For these  computations,  the  interest  rate and  inflation  are measured  in annualized  percentage 
points,  and output  is measured  as a percentage  deviation  from trend. 
nomic  performance,  not  the  stochastic  variation in Fed policy  (which, 
according to our estimates,  has been minimal). 
One can gain some  understanding  of the effect of alternative system- 
atic monetary  policies  by comparing the predicted consequences  of sim- 
ple feedback rules of the kind discussed  by Taylor (1993b), 
rt =  r'Tt  +  eyYt 
under alternative values  for the coefficients  0r and Oy.  Rows 3-5  of Table 
2  report  predicted  moments  of  the  data  for three  possible  choices  of 
these  coefficients.  In row 3, we consider a "Taylor  rule" with 0r =  1.5, Oy 
=  0.5-  values  which  are close  to those  used  by Taylor to characterize 
current policy (his exact coefficients are in footnote 2).32  According to our 
model,  adherence  to this rule would  make a difference,  since both infla- 
tion and interest rates would  be significantly more variable. 
Even sharper contrasts between  policy rules are possible if we vary the 
coefficients  of the  "Taylor rule." Row 4 considers  a policy  in which  in- 
stead  0r =  1 and  0y = 5. The increased response  to deviations  of output 
from trend is predicted  to reduce  the variance of output  fluctuations  to 
about a tenth of its value under the historical policy regime. This stabiliza- 
tion of output,  however,  is accompanied  by increased volatility of infla- 
tion  and  short-term  nominal  interest  rates.  (A counterfactual historical 
simulation  assuming  this policy rule is shown  in Figure 4.) For purposes 
of contrast, row 5 of the table considers  a "Taylor  rule" in which  60 =  10 
32. The rule that we  simulate  here is not exactly Taylor's, since he assumes  that the funds 
rate responds  to the rate of inflation in the current and previous  three quarters, while 
our rule assumes  that it responds  to the rate of inflation in the current quarter only. 332 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
Figure  4 SIMULATED  "TAYLOR  RULE"  (0, = 1, 0y  = 5) 
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and  0y =  0.  The increased  response  to fluctuations  in inflation  is pre- 
dicted  to reduce  the variance of inflation to about an eighth  of its value 
under  the historical policy. Inflation stabilization,  however,  is accompa- 
nied by increased  volatility of both output and interest rates. 
These  comparisons  show  that according to our model,  monetary  pol- 
icy matters  a great deal  for the behavior  of both  output  and  inflation, 
since either inflation or output can be stabilized to a much greater extent 
than it has been  historically. This raises the obvious  question  of which 
policy rule results in more desirable  patterns of fluctuations.  We take this 
up in the next section. 
7. The  Welfare  Loss  from  Price-Level  Instability 
We wish  to  consider  the  consequences  of alternative  monetary  policy 
rules  for the  value  achieved  in equilibrium by  the  lifetime  utility  (3.1) 
of the  representative  household.  The precise  comparison  that we  pro- 
pose  to make  is the  following.  Associated  with  any stationary rational- 
expectations  equilibrium  of the kind  discussed  above  (resulting  from a 
time-invariant  feedback  rule  for  monetary  policy)  is  an  unconditional 
expected  value  of  (3.1),  averaging  over  all  the  possible  histories  of 
shocks  that may have  occurred prior to date zero.  We propose  to com- 
pare  stationary  equilibria  in  terms  of  the  value  of  this  unconditional 
expected  utility. In this way, we  take a "long-run" perspective  in evalu- 
ating alternative  policy  rules; we  do not consider  the advantages  that a 
particular rule  may  have  that  result  from the  nature  of  the  particular 
fortuitous  initial conditions  that may exist at the time that one contem- 
plates commitment  to such a rule. 
This objective  is easily  seen  to be equivalent  to maximization  of the 
simpler objective function 
W =  E (u(Ct) 
- 
v(y,(z))  dz )  (7.1) 
where  E refers to the unconditional  expectation.  This objective averages 
the disutility  of working  across households  at a point in time, because, 
from our "long-run" perspective,  any given household  is equally likely to 
be in the situation  of any one  of the households  (which differ, after all, 
only in the sequence  of times at which they have been able to change the 
prices of the goods  that they sell). By including the integral over z in (7.1), 
we do not need  to interpret the expectation  operator E as referring to an 
average over possible  histories of opportunities  for an individual seller to 
change its prices, but only an average over possible histories of the aggre- 
gate shocks  (i.e.,  the disturbances  to preferences and technology). 334 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
We furthermore simplify  our analysis by taking a second-order  Taylor 
series approximation  to our objective (7.1). (More details of these calcula- 
tions  can be  found  in  Rotemberg  and  Woodford,  1997b.) This has  the 
advantage  of allowing  us to derive an approximate loss function that can 
be  evaluated  using  only the  log-linear  approximate  characterization  of 
the equilibrium,  obtained by solving  the equations  derived in Section 3. 
Another  advantage  is that we  obtain a loss  function  that can be written 
as a weighted  sum of contributions from the variances of various endoge- 
nous  series,  which  allows  direct comparison of our conclusions  with the 
ad hoc loss functions  typically assumed  in the literature. 
At the cost of not being  able to evaluate  the effect of monetary policy 
on the long-run  level  of output,  we  suppose  that changes  in monetary 
policy  are accompanied  by changes  in the constant income-tax rate T so 
that this tax is optimal in each case. This ensures  that, roughly speaking, 
the average  level  of output  is optimal and independent  of monetary pol- 
icy. Our idea here is to separate the issue  of the welfare losses  associated 
with fluctuations in output from those due to a suboptimal average  level of 
output,  due (for example) to the presence  of monopolistic  competition  or 
distorting  taxes,  and to make monetary policy responsible  solely for the 
minimization  of  the  former  losses,  assuming  that  other  policy  instru- 
ments  will be used  to ensure  the  desired  average level  of output.  This 
assignment  of tasks to policy  instruments  makes  sense  if, as a practical 
matter, the tax code can affect the long-run level of output but cannot be 
adjusted  rapidly  enough  to be  used  to ensure  an optimal  response  to 
stochastic  disturbances. 
In Rotemberg  and  Woodford  (1997b), we  show  that  a second-order 
approximation  to W takes the form 
=  -  +  var [E(Y-  )] + (  +  o)E var  log  (z)(7.2)  W=  - uY  I(cr +  c) var [E,2(yt  -  Y)]  +  (&'  )E var, log y,(z) (7.2) 
2  L 
plus  terms  that  are  of  third  or higher  order  in  the  amplitude  of  the 
shocks,  and  terms that are unaffected  by monetary  policy.  (Such terms 
are similarly neglected  in the expressions  that follow.) Thus our measure 
of  deadweight  loss  depends  upon  the  variability of  aggregate  output 
around the "natural rate," but also upon  the dispersion  of output levels 
across producers  of different goods.  The second  term, in turn, depends 
solely  upon  the  degree  of  price  dispersion,  since  the  demand  curve 
(3.13) implies  that 
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Finally, our-price setting  equations  imply that 
a  var (Et-2i)  + (1 + 4)  1  (7  E [var- log  p1(z)I  =  I  -2r  (7.4)  E [vz  g  t(z)]  (1 -  2  var  (7At -  Et-27t)  +  (Et  )2 ] 
Thus the degree  of price dispersion  that exists on average increases with 
average  inflation,  with  the variability of the rate of inflation forecasted 
two  quarters in  advance,  and  with  the  variability of unexpected  infla- 
tion. Substituting  (7.3) and (7.4) into (7.2), one obtains 
W =  -  uY(  +  )a(  )2 [  -a)  var Et2(  -  )  2  [(1-  at3)t 
+var  (Et 2it)  +  (1  +  -i) var  (*t  -  Et-2it)  +(E)2  .  (7.5) 
This is the welfare criterion in terms of which we shall compare alterna- 
tive  policies.  Note  that  only  two  structural parameters,  namely  4'  and 
(1-a)K/[(1-ac3)0],  matter for the  relative ranking  of alternative  policies 
(as opposed  to  a computation  of  the  absolute  size  of  the  deadweight 
loss). 
One  can furthermore  show  that the factor in square brackets in (7.5) 
equals L +  r*2, where  T*  is the average inflation rate and 
(1 -  A)  L =  (  var Et2(Xt -  Xt+) + var Et2Xt 
K(1 -  a,S)o 
+  var (X  -  Et-2X).  (7.6) 
L is the welfare  loss  from output  and inflation variability, denominated 
in the  units  of the variance of inflation.  This loss  obviously  reaches  an 
absolute  minimum  when  Xt is a constant,  so that inflation is constant. 
On the other hand,  the remaining loss  term in (7.5) is minimized  when 
average inflation is zero. Thus the welfare measure W achieves  its theo- 
retical maximum  value  of zero when  inflation is constant  and equal to 
zero, which  is to say, when  prices are constant over time.33 
33. Our finding that price stability  is optimal  in our model is closely related  to King and 
Wolman's (1996) argument that, in their closely related model, price stability  leads 
output to behave as it would if prices  were flexible.  Note that this conclusion  depends 
upon a number  of special  features  of the model developed  here, in particular,  upon the 
assumption that the existence of nominal price rigidities  is the only distortion  that 
prevents equilibria  from  necessarily  being optimal. 336 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
We momentarily  ignore  the choice  of the average inflation  rate, and 
show  that there  is a policy  that ensures  that Xt is constant  so that L is 
zero.3  The  only  effects  of  a nonzero  v*  on  our equilibrium  are to in- 
crease  the  interest  rate in each  period  by  7r*  while  X is increased  by a 
constant  as well.  Substituting  constants  for both Xt and it into the struc- 
tural equations  (3.9),  (3.12), and (3.18), we  see that an equilibrium with 
steady  inflation involves 
Y  =  Et2Yt  +  Gt  -  Et2,  t  (7.7) 
and 
Et-lRt=  w[(t,  -  Yt)  -  Et_2(t  -  Yt)] 
+oEtl[(6t  -  YS)  -  (6t+l  +  Y+)],  (7.8) 
where  we  have neglected  the constants.  It is then easily verified that all 
of the structural equations  are satisfied if these two are, and X^  and  't  are 
constant.  This establishes  the possibility,  in principle,  of complete  infla- 
tion stabilization. 
Note that (7.8) only determines  Et_ Rt. This is the only restriction upon 
the path of short-term nominal interest rates implied by price stability. To 
avoid adding unnecessary  noise to interest rates, the central bank should 
also ensure  that the actual value of Rt (as opposed  to only its expectation 
at t -  1) is given  by the right-hand  side of (7.8). This has the additional 
advantage  that  it economizes  on  the  information  requirements  of  the 
central bank, since it makes interest rates at t depend  only on the period- 
t -  1 information  set. 
Using  our estimated  processes  for the real shocks,  we  now  consider 
the  fluctuations  in  output  and  interest  rates that would  obtain  under 
such a first-best policy. Such an equilibrium would  have required output 
to vary much  more than it did under historical policy; Table 2 indicates 
that  this  minimum-L  policy  would  have  led  to  a  variance  of  output 
nearly four times as large as the variance implied by the historical policy. 
This is mainly  due  to the highly  volatile character of our inferred series 
for the  "supply"  disturbances  Yt. According  to our model,  the  reason 
output movements  have been so much smaller under the actual policy is 
34. We do not analyze  in this paper the form of the interest-rate feedback rule that achieves 
this  stationary  equilibrium.  It is  unlikely  that  only  one  feedback  rule  supports  this 
optimum;  alternative  rules may support  the same stationary equilibrium but differ in 
the  behavior  specified  for the  central bank  off  the  equilibrium  path.  However,  it is 
worth  noting  that in general  the rule must  be more complicated  than any member of 
the  family  (2.1).  The implementation  issue  is  taken up  in the context  of a simplified 
version  of our model  in Bernanke and Woodford (1997). Optimization-Based  Econometric  Framework  *  337 
that the actual policy  consistently  "leans against the wind,"  so that the 
interest rate is increased whenever  output rises. As has been pointed out 
by  numerous  authors  [see,  e.g.,  Rotemberg  (1983), Ireland (1997), and 
Aiyagari and Braun (1996)], such countercyclical policy is not appropri- 
ate  in  response  to  supply  shocks  of  the  sort represented  by  Yt.  With 
sticky prices  an increase  in Yt, which  reduces  marginal costs,  tends  to 
lower  prices and thus raise output.  However,  if interest rates are raised 
in response  to the output increase,  prices fall by less than marginal cost, 
so this fall in prices is not sufficient for output to increase by the amount 
that Yt increases.  A policy  of price stability requires that the monetary 
authority  accommodate  the increase in output  required by the increase 
in Yt. As a result,  output becomes  more variable if YA  is variable. 
The path of interest rates that would  have achieved  complete inflation 
stabilization  involves  very large swings  in interest  rates and is remark- 
ably choppy.  In particular, as Table 2 indicates,  the variance of the funds 
rate along this path is 733 (a standard deviation of 27 percentage points), 
while  the variance of the funds rate under the historical policy is only 7.6 
(a standard deviation  only a tenth that large). One consequence  of this is 
that such a policy is not consistent  with a low average interest rate (and 
inflation rate) unless  the nominal interest rate can be negative.  Thus, as 
suggested  by Summers  (1991), the zero nominal-interest-rate  floor poses 
an impediment  to stabilization  policy with  a low  average level  of infla- 
tion.35 Given  our parameters,  complete  stabilization  of inflation  would 
require an average  inflation  rate near 50% per year to keep  the federal 
funds rate positive  in all quarters over our sample period. But that would 
imply other sorts of welfare losses,  both those indicated by (Ei,t)2 in (7.5) 
that result  from the  increased  dispersion  of prices across  suppliers,  as 
well  as  the  more  conventional  "shoe-leather  costs"  (from which  our 
model  abstracts). 
Thus our analysis  leads  to the conclusion  that completely  stable infla- 
tion is inconsistent  with  a low  average  inflation  rate. This occurs in our 
model because  we find there to be fairly large fluctuations in Y^.  Insulat- 
ing  prices  from  the  effects  of  these  supply  shocks  requires  very  large 
swings  in the interest rate if, as seems  plausible and as is implied by our 
parameters,  relatively  large movements  in interest  rates are needed  to 
change the prices that firms choose  to set. Because of the costs of having 
35. The discussion  of the  model  in Section  3 has ignored  this  floor, because  that model 
abstracts altogether  from the fact that money  balances are held.  If, however,  we intro- 
duce liquidity  services  from non-interest-earning  money  into (3.1), we obtain an addi- 
tional  equilibrium  condition  representing  the  demand  for money.  This  equilibrium 
condition  will be inconsistent  with an equilibrium nominal interest rate that is negative 
in any period.  Note  that the introduction  of a demand  for money  need  have no effect 
other than imposing  Rt ~  1 for all t upon  the system  of equations  derived in Section 3. 338 *  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
to maintain a high average rate of inflation,  it is likely to be desirable to 
accept  some  degree  of inflation  variability for the  sake of reducing  the 
size of the swings  in nominal interest rates required in order to stabilize 
inflation.  It is thus of interest to consider  the costs,  in terms of a higher 
value of L, that must be accepted in order to reduce the variability of the 
Federal funds  rate. We thus  consider  the nature of the equilibrium that 
achieves  the  minimum  possible  value  of (7.6) subject to a constraint  of 
the form 
var  t <  VR.  (7.9) 
Figure 5 shows  the trade-off between  the constraint parameter vR and 
the minimum  attainable level of the welfare loss L from inflation variabil- 
ity, which,  as noted  above,  is expressed  in units of the variance of infla- 
tion. This figure, which  has the variance of the federal funds rate on the 
horizontal  axis,  shows  that the  minimum  attainable loss  L is a convex 
function  of vR.  In particular, the deadweight  loss from inflation variation 
Figure  5 THE  TRADEOFF  BETWEEN  INTEREST-RATE  VOLATILITY  AND 
WELFARE  LOSS  L 
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hardly rises as the variance of nominal interest rates is reduced from its 
optimal value of 733 to a value less than one-seventh  that size (correspond- 
ing to a standard deviation  on the order of 10 percentage points).  Further 
reductions  in the volatility of interest rates have larger effects on welfare, 
but even  reducing  the variance of the funds  rate to something  near its 
recent level  requires an increase in L that is only a fraction of the dead- 
weight  loss  associated  with  current policy, according  to our estimates. 
The question  then  becomes  which  point  in Figure 5 is optimal  once 
one  recognizes  that  points  with  more  volatile  interest  rates  require 
higher average inflation rates. Here we pursue  a crude approach to this 
problem by imposing  the constraint that the average federal funds  rate 
must be no smaller than k times the standard deviation of the funds rate, 
for some  k >  0.36  Since the average  (or steady-state)  funds  rate is given 
by r* = p +  T*,  where p is the steady-state  real rate of return (determined 
by the rate of time preference),  this constraint can be written in the form 
p +  4r*  7  ka(R).  (7.10) 
This constraint indicates  how  a higher degree  of variability of the funds 
rate requires a higher target rate of inflation H*.  We can then ask which, 
among  the  log-linear  approximate  equilibria characterized  earlier that 
satisfy  (7.10) in  addition  to  the  other  equilibrium  conditions,  achieves 
the highest  value of (7.5). 
Under our log-linear approximate characterization of equilibrium, the 
value  of L achieved  in any stationary equilibrium is independent  of the 
target inflation  rate  T*  around which  inflation fluctuates.  (Our approxi- 
mate  equilibrium  conditions  are  derived  by  log-linearizing  around  a 
steady state with zero inflation, but continue to represent a valid approxi- 
mation as long as rr*  is small enough.)  Thus we can consider, on the one 
hand,  the lowest  value of L consistent  with a given value of or(A),  given 
the structural equations  used  to derive Figure 5, and on the other hand, 
the lowest  value  of 'r*2  consistent  with  the value  of ar(A),  given  (7.10). 
The  sum  of  these  two  terms,  expressed  as  functions  of  cr(k), is mini- 
mized by the unique value of Ra() for which 
{-2a(R)}  + {2k[ko(A) -  p]} = 0, 
36. In the event that the exogenous shocks have bounded supports, this is a sufficient 
condition  for nonnegativity  of the funds rate  at all times, and necessary  within the class 
of equilibria  in which the state variables  all are linear  functions of the shocks. This 
makes a natural  case to consider,  given our use of linearization  methods  here to charac- 
terize equilibria.  In general, however, the optimal  equilibrium  subject  to the constraint 
that the funds rate must always be nonnegative is unlikely to belong to the class of 
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where  the two  terms in curly braces represent,  respectively,  the deriva- 
tives of L and  7e2 with  respect to cr(l), and where  -A  (with A >0)  is the 
slope  of  the  locus  graphed  in  Figure  5.  We assume  p  =  3%/year, as 
indicated  by the long-run  values  r* and qr*  resulting from historical pol- 
icy (according to our VAR) and k = 2.26, which  is the largest value such 
that  the  historical  equilibrium  (according  to  our  VAR) would  satisfy 
(7.10). Then this condition  is satisfied at the point in Figure 5 where  A = 
0.22 and var R =  1.93, which  requires a target inflation rate of at least  r* 
= 0.14%/year. This is a positive  rate of inflation,  as conjectured by Sum- 
mers,  but  a trivially  small  one.  Furthermore,  this  calculation  neglects 
other  costs  of  inflation,  such  as  the  costs  of  economizing  on  money 
balances  that are emphasized  in much  of the literature. Taking account 
of such  costs  would  only  make  the optimal  average inflation  rate even 
lower,  as would  the choice of a lower value for k. 
Hence,  because  there exist only small gains in terms of reduction of L 
from raising  the  variability of interest  rates beyond  what  is consistent 
with  zero average  inflation,  the trade-off indicated  in Figure 5 is favor- 
able towards  keeping  inflation low. If there are additional,  independent 
reasons  for the Fed to prefer not to have a highly variable funds rate (as 
discussed,  for example,  by Goodfriend,  1991), then these  would  justify 
choice of a point even further to the left in Figure 5, and hence of an even 
lower target rate of inflation. 
It is of particular interest  to compare  the  constrained-optimal  policy 
that minimizes  L while  keeping  the average inflation rate at 0.14% with 
the  actual  policy  of  the  Fed.  This  constrained-optimal  policy  has  the 
immediate  advantages  that its average level  of inflation and its variance 
of interest rates are considerably  smaller than under the historical policy. 
Moreover, as the figure and Table 2 indicate,  the loss from variability (L) 
under  this policy  is only  about a fourth as large as under the estimated 
historical policy. The variance of output doubles  relative to the historical 
policy, but according to the model  this is desirable as well,  since output 
is kept closer to the "natural rate." 
To illustrate how  the constrained-optimal  policy would  differ from ac- 
tual policy, Figure 6 plots the impulse  responses  of output,  inflation, and 
interest rates to the two real shocks, under the constrained-optimal  policy 
and under our estimate  of historical policy. The two shocks are orthogo- 
nalized as follows.  One period-t shock (the one considered  in the second 
column)  is  defined  as  the  innovation  in  period-t  +  1  autonomous 
spending-i.e.,  the part of Gt+1  that could not be forecast on the basis of 
output,  inflation,  and interest rates through period t. The other period-t 
shock (the one considered  in the first column) is defined  as that compo- 
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Figure 6 IMPULSE RESPONSES UNDER ACTUAL AND  CONSTRAINED- 
OPTIMAL POLICY 
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to  the  innovation  in  autonomous  spending.  The  specific  shock  repre- 
sented  in  the  first column  is  a supply shock that increases  equilibrium 
inflation ~t+  (under the historical policy rule) by 1%  more than one would 
have expected  given the level of autonomous  spending;  the shock repre- 
sented  in the second  column  is an autonomous  spending shock  that raises 
real spending  Yt+1  by 1%. 
In  each  panel  of  the  figure,  the  dashed  line  indicates  the  impulse 
response  to  the  shock  under  the  historical policy,  while  the  solid  line 
indicates  the response  that would  occur under  the constrained-optimal 
policy.  Under  historical  policy,  both  types  of  shocks  are inflationary, 
leading  to increases  in inflation that persist for many quarters, and so to 
a  large  eventual  cumulative  increase  in  the  price  level.  Under  the 
constrained-optimal  policy, prices also rise slightly  on impact. But what 
is striking about the constrained-optimal  policy is that it ultimately leads 
prices to fall in response  to these  inflationary shocks.  Thus inflationary 
shocks  are accompanied  by expected  deflation  in subsequent  quarters. 
The result is that the constrained-optimal  policy not only stabilizes infla- 
tion to a greater extent  than  under  current policy, it also  stabilizes  the 
price  level to a considerable  extent. 
Another striking difference between  historical and constrained-optimal 
policy has to do with  the effect of supply  shocks  on real activity. Under 
historical policy, real output is largely insulated from the effects of supply 
shocks,  which instead result in persistent fluctuations in inflation. Under 
the constrained-optimal  policy, instead,  an adverse  supply  shock results 
in relatively large increase in interest rates and a sharp transitory contrac- 
tion  of real activity.  It is  for this  reason  that  (as Table 2 indicates)  the 
constrained-optimal  policy involves  much greater output variability than 
has occurred under the historical policy. 
By contrast, output movements  in response  to the autonomous  spend- 
ing shock are quite similar under historical and constrained-optimal  pol- 
icy. Historical policy has allowed  output to respond  to these  shocks,  but 
according  to  our  model  it is  desirable  for this  to  occur.  The  nominal 
interest rate rises less under the constrained-optimal  policy, and returns 
more quickly to normal. However,  real interest rates are not significantly 
lower  during  the transition back to the steady  state, because  this policy 
induces  deflation  as discussed  above. 
Table 2 also provides  a nice contrast between  this constrained-optimal 
policy  and  the  "Taylor rule" whose  coefficients  are 06 =  10 and  Oy  =  0. 
These  two  policies  induce  about the same variance of inflation and out- 
put  while  also  having  similar losses  from variability L. However,  the 
simple  "Taylor rule" achieves  this by having  interest rates react aggres- 
sively  to inflation,  and this leads  interest  rates to be very volatile.  Our Optimization-Based  Econometric  Framework  *  343 
constrained-optimal  rule,  by  contrast,  allows  interest  rates  to  be  less 
variable by tailoring the dynamic response  to shocks more appropriately. 
8.  Conclusions 
This  paper  has  provided  a  method  for  computing  optimal  monetary 
policy in the context of an optimizing  model that fits the U.S. data nearly 
as well  as an unrestricted  vector autoregression.  The two basic ingredi- 
ents of this method  are a vector autoregression  of the variables of interest 
and an optimizing  model  that predicts the evolution  of these  variables. 
As long  as the model  can match the estimated  impulse  responses  of the 
variables to a monetary  shock, the method  can be applied easily, because 
it is straightforward to fit the response  of the model to the other shocks. 
Thus, the method  can accommodate  much richer vector autoregressions 
than the one  we  have  considered,  as well  as more elaborate models.  In 
this paper we have worked with a minimal model, both to show how this 
method  can be applied  and  to show  that even  very  simple  optimizing 
models  can fit the data rather well.  Even so, it would be desirable to have 
a model  that deals  explicitly  with  investment  and  the  resulting  capital 
accumulation  as well as with labor-market variables. 
In addition  to providing  a method  of analysis,  we have also been able 
to reach interesting  conclusions  regarding  optimal  monetary  policy.  In 
particular, the complete  stabilization of inflation appears to require fairly 
large  swings  in  interest  rates,  which,  given  a zero  interest-rate  floor, 
require a high average interest rate and thus a high inflation rate. Thus, 
the  existence  of  this  floor limits  the  degree  to which  it is  desirable  to 
stabilize inflation.  On the other hand, it appears to be possible,  at least in 
principle,  both to lower  the average inflation rate and to stabilize infla- 
tion more than has been done historically in the U.S. While this requires 
that inflationary  shocks  still be allowed  to increase inflation transitorily, 
such shocks  must be followed  by deflation shortly thereafter. The result 
is  that  neither  surges  in  autonomous  spending  nor  adverse  supply 
shocks  lead to long-run  increases in prices. 
Our specific conclusions  as to the desirable responses  of output,  infla- 
tion,  and interest  rates to stochastic  disturbances  may well be sensitive 
to the particular optimizing  model we have considered  and,  specifically, 
to the  absence  of other  types  of stochastic  disturbances,  such  as time- 
varying labor-market distortions and changes  over time in firms' desired 
markups  of price over marginal cost.  These are issues  that only further 
investigation  of other, more elaborate optimizing  models  can settle.  Our 
main hope  with  this paper is precisely  to shift the debate over optimal 
monetary policy so that it will involve  different optimizing  models,  all of 344  ROTEMBERG  & WOODFORD 
which  fit the data reasonably well,  instead of involving  equations that fit 
well by construction  but that have only a tenuous  connection  to explicit 
behavioral hypotheses  at the microeconomic  level. 
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1. Introduction 
This  paper  espouses  several  admirable  goals.  First, it aims  to build  a 
simple  rational-expectations  macroeconometric  model  from an optimiz- 
ing framework. At least two advantages  attach to this approach. The first 
is that to the extent that the model is built upon stable micro parameters, 
it has some  hope  of addressing  the Lucas critique (1976). Of course,  the 
model  is  not  certain  to be  invulnerable  to the  critique by virtue  of its 
346 *  FUHRER 
Roberts,  J. M. (1995).  New Keynesian  economics  and the Phillips  curve.  Journal  of 
Money,  Credit  and  Banking  27:(4):975-984. 
Rotemberg, J. J. (1982). Sticky prices in the United States. Journal  of Political 
Economy  90(6):1187-1211. 
.  (1983). Supply shocks, sticky prices and monetary policy. Journal  of 
Money,  Credit  and  Banking  15(4):433-435. 
. J. J. and M. Woodford.  (1996).  Imperfect  competition  and the effects of 
energy price  increases  on economic  activity.  Journal  of  Money,  Credit  and  Banking 
28(4):549-577. 
,and  . (1997a).  The cyclical  behavior  of prices and costs. Princeton 
University.  Mimeo. 
, and  . (1997b).  An optimization-based  econometric  framework  for 
the evaluation of monetary policy. Cambridge,  MA: National Bureau  of Eco- 
nomic Research.  NBER  Working  Paper,  forthcoming. 
Sims, C. A. (1986). Are forecasting  models usable for policy analysis? Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  Minneapolis  Quarterly  Review  10(1):2-16. 
Solon, G., R. Barsky,  and J. A. Parker.  (1994).  Measuring  the cyclicality  of real 
wages: How  important is  composition bias? Quarterly  Journal  of Economics 
109(1):1-26. 
Strongin, S. (1995).  The identification  of monetary  policy disturbances:  Explain- 
ing the liquidity  puzzle. Journal  of  Monetary  Economics  35(3):463-498. 
Summers, L. (1991). How should long term monetary policy be determined? 
Journal  of Money,  Credit  and  Banking  23(3):625-631. 
Taylor,  J. B. (1980).  Aggregate  dynamics  and staggered  contracts.  Journal  of  Politi- 
cal  Economy  88(1):1-23. 
.  (1993a). Macroeconomic  Policy in a World  Economy.  New  York:  W. W. 
Norton. 
. (1993b).  Discretion  versus policy rules in practice.  Carnegie-Rochester  Con- 
ference  Series  on Public  Policy  39:195-214. 
Woodford,  M. (1996).  Control  of the public debt:  A requirement  for price stabil- 
ity? Cambridge,  MA: National Bureau  of Economic  Research.  NBER  Working 
Paper  5684. 
Comment 
JEFF  FUHRER 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Boston 
1. Introduction 
This  paper  espouses  several  admirable  goals.  First, it aims  to build  a 
simple  rational-expectations  macroeconometric  model  from an optimiz- 
ing framework. At least two advantages  attach to this approach. The first 
is that to the extent that the model is built upon stable micro parameters, 
it has some  hope  of addressing  the Lucas critique (1976). Of course,  the 
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micro  foundations.  But it has  a hope  of  being  robust  to  the  critique. 
Second,  the welfare function for policy analysis arises naturally from the 
agents' objective function.  Many pervious studies have used ad hoc objec- 
tive functions,  such as weighted  combinations  of the variances of output 
around  potential  and  inflation  around  its target. It is not  obvious  that 
such  metrics  appropriately  reflect  the  loss  of  welfare  associated  with 
employment  and price fluctuations. 
A second goal of the paper is to estimate the model,  seriously confront- 
ing the structure with the important dynamic properties of output,  infla- 
tion, and nominal interest rates as summarized in a vector autoregression. 
This impulse  is  essential  if one's  ultimate  goal  is  to use  the  model  to 
deliver advice to monetary policymakers.  It is too easy to write an elegant 
theoretical  model,  and too difficult to write a model  that also replicates 
key  dynamic  elements  found  in the  data.  Policymakers will  rightly be 
leery  of the  former, and  at least  somewhat  more comfortable with  the 
latter. 
The paper then uses  the model  to perform counterfactual policy exer- 
cises  (how  would  a different  policy  have  altered the  outcome?)  and to 
compute  an  "optimal" monetary  policy.  Both of these  model  exercises 
are of inherent  interest to practical policymakers and to researchers. 
In my discussion  of the paper, I want  to focus on a few fundamental 
issues. 
1.  Is the Rotemberg-Woodford  model  still subject to the Lucas critique? 
2.  How  efficiently  are the  behavioral  parameters  estimated,  and  how 
generalizable  is their estimation  technique? 
3.  How  does  monetary  policy work in the model? 
4.  How  important  are the  innovations  (the  disturbance  terms)  to  the 
empirical success  of the model? 
To anticipate,  I will  suggest  that the model  is still subject to the Lucas 
critique in two important ways,  that the behavioral parameters could be 
estimated  with a more efficient use of information,  that monetary policy 
works in a nonstandard  way in the model,  and that the dynamics  in the 
disturbance terms are crucial to the empirical performance of the model. 
2.  The  Lucas  Critique 
The  paper  claims  that  its  modeling  strategy  adequately  addresses  the 
Lucas critique. I think it has only partially done so. The Lucas critique is, 
after all, a theoretical assertion that ultimately rests on empirical testing. 
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in our models,  so that agents  alter their view  of the future when  policy- 
makers and other alter the systematic  component  of their behavior. 
Some  more  of  the  critique  may be  deflected-although  we  cannot 
know  this a priori-when  we  use  optimizing  foundations  for our mod- 
els. The logic is,  of course,  that an individuals'  taste parameters may be 
assumed  to be fairly stable in response  to the behavior of policymakers 
(or others),  whereas  the reduced-form consumption  rule that arises from 
the interaction of taste parameters, budget constraints,  and expectations 
of future resources  should  not be assumed  to be stable. When a model 
represents  aggregate  consumer  choice  with  a single  parameter for the 
intertemporal  elasticity of substitution,  a single parameter reflecting the 
time  rate of preference,  and  so  on,  we  must  admit the possibility  that 
these  aggregated  concepts  may not be time-invariant.  The effects of the 
changing  demographic  composition  of the population  and the introduc- 
tion  of  new  products  and  technologies  may  render aggregate  "micro" 
parameters  unstable.  In any event,  we  can and must test whether  such 
models  are in fact stable across time and regimes. 
Such  testing  would  be  easy  to  do  in  this  paper.  The  authors  have 
already  taken  a stand  on  when  a break in  monetary  regime  occurred 
(1979). They can easily allow for a separate reaction function before 1980 
and  test  for the  stability  of the  other  structural parameters before  and 
after 1980. Such a test would go a long way towards empirically establish- 
ing the robustness  of the model  specification  to the Lucas critique. 
I will  return  to  a  second  Lucas-critique  concern  in  a moment.  The 
thrust  of  the  argument  is  that  the  disturbance  terms  identified  in  the 
paper are at least  as likely to be subject to the Lucas critique as are the 
behavioral parameters. 
3.  Estimating  the Structural  Parameters 
The  behavioral  parameters  are  chosen  so  as  to  match  the  structural 
model's  and the VAR's response  to a federal-funds-rate shock. However, 
as Rotemberg  and Woodford  document  in their framework,  the funds- 
rate shock accounts  for no more than 5% of the variation in the endoge- 
nous  variables.  While this estimator should  deliver consistent  estimates 
of the behavioral parameters,  it is certainly inefficient with respect to the 
full set  of information  in the  vector  autocovariance  function  used  as a 
metric by  Rotemberg  and  Woodford  later in the paper. The funds-rate 
impulse  responses  contain  some  of the second-moment  information  in 
the data, weighted  in a particular way. The autocovariance function has 
all the  second-moment  information  in  the  VAR. An  alternative  to  the 
impulse-response  estimator  is  to  fit  the  model  to  the  autocovariance Comment  349 
function  by  maximizing  the  model's  likelihood.  This  method  is  both 
computationally  feasible and econometrically  efficient.1 
Of more  concern  is the  extent  to which  Rotemberg and  Woodford's 
estimation  strategy  can be  generalized.  It is well  known  that it is not 
possible  to map reduced-form  responses  to (orthogonalized)  VAR inno- 
vations  into structural model responses  to model innovations.  The map- 
ping  is  one-to-one  in  the  case  studied  in this  paper: the  VAR-derived 
reaction function  is common  to both the VAR and the structural model. 
But as Rotemberg  and Woodford  show  in Section 5 of their paper,  the 
correspondence  is nontrivial for the other disturbances in their model.  In 
general,  such  a mapping  will  not  be  possible,  and  thus  the  estimator 
cannot be used  for most cases. 
4. Monetary  Policy  in the  Model 
Monetary policy behaves  differently  in this model  than in conventional 
descriptions.  The reason is that there are essentially  no lags in this model 
other than those in the reaction function.  The one exception is consump- 
tion,  which  is assumed  to be predetermined  two periods  ahead.  I don't 
know  what  economic  behavior  motivates  this  assumption,  although  it 
certainly  helps  the  model  to  fit  the  delayed  response  of  output  to  a 
federal-funds-rate  shock in the VAR. Without this assumption,  if mone- 
tary policy  did  not  respond  with  a lag,  then  the  model  would  have 
literally no dynamics  (other than the dynamics in the disturbance terms). 
Everything would  jump immediately  to its equilibrium (even with sticky 
prices). 
This sounds  very different from standard depictions  of monetary pol- 
icy. Many have cited Friedman's "long and variable lags" of the effects of 
policy. The Fed needs  to look ahead because it is steering a huge,  inertial 
tanker that responds  very  gradually to its actions.  That sense  is totally 
absent in Rotemberg and Woodford's model.  In fact, in their model,  the 
Fed is driving an extremely responsive  Lamborghini, but for no particu- 
lar reason it moves  the steering wheel  very gradually, as if it were at the 
wheel  of a 1972 Ford Pinto.  This logical  disconnect  between  the Fed's 
inertial behavior  and  the  economy  it attempts  to influence  allows  the 
structural model  to  exhibit  some  persistent  dynamics,  but  one  has  to 
wonder  why  the  Fed would  act in that way  if the  economy  really be- 
haved  as depicted  here. 
1. Estimating  the  structural parameters  in this way  took less  than  one  minute  on  a Sun 
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5.  The  Role  of the  Disturbance  Terms 
Rotemberg and Woodford identify  disturbance terms that embody  com- 
plex  dynamics,  which,  when  added  to the behavioral  equations  in the 
model,  capture  almost  all  of  the  covariance  information  in  the  VAR. 
What  does  this  exercise  tell  us?  In short,  I think  it tells  us  that  they 
should  wave  the white  flag. It seems  fair to ask economists  to surrender 
when  they are forced to conclude  that the dynamics  present  in the data 
can only  be explained  by things  whose  dynamics  arise for reasons  that 
we can't explain. 
However,  the  extent  to which  the  disturbance  terms account  for the 
dynamics  is not as clear as it could be in the paper. Therefore, I propose 
a model  diagnostic  to  determine  the  contribution  made  by  the  distur- 
bances:  I exclude  the  disturbances  from  the  model,  and  compute  the 
resulting  "error-free" autocovariance  function.2 As Figure 1 of this com- 
ment shows,  the resulting  autocovariance functions  don't look at all like 
those  in Figure 2 of the paper.  For Rotemberg and Woodford's  model, 
this  diagnostic  tells  us  that  the  disturbance  terms  are responsible  for 
explaining  virtually all of the dynamics  evident  in the VAR.3 
Put in a more positive  light, Rotemberg and Woodford's paper raises a 
fundamental  question  about where  to draw the line between  a model's 
ability to generate dynamics  based on its behavioral equations and based 
on  its  error processes.  Microeconomic  shocks  to taste  and  technology 
might  well  be  serially correlated,  so one  should  not by default  assume 
that they are i.i.d.  The question  is how  much the model  should  rely on 
its disturbances  for its dynamics. 
Finally, it is not clear why  the authors use VAR-based expectations  to 
solve  for  the  disturbance  terms.  This  procedure  implies  a mixed-bag 
model  with  structural parameters  derived  from the  impulse  response 
assuming  rational expectations,  and disturbances that are computed  tak- 
ing  those  parameters  as  given  and  using  VAR expectations.  Below,  I 
sketch  a method  that  retrieves  the  disturbance  terms jointly  with  the 
structural parameters,  assuming  rational expectations  throughout. 
2. To estimate  the  autocovariance  function,  I compute  the  disturbance  terms implied  by 
Rotemberg and Woodford's model and parameters, using methods  documented  in Fuh- 
rer and Moore (1995). I then "whiten" the disturbances,  regressing  each on its own lags 
and  the  lags  of other  disturbances,  and  calculate the  residual  covariance  matrix from 
these  residuals.  This residual  covariance  matrix, together  with  the  structural parame- 
ters, uniquely  determines  the autocovariance  function implied by the model.  I checked 
the sensitivity  of the autocovariance function to the estimation of the residual covariance 
matrix; the qualitative  results  presented  here in Figure 1 are completely  unaffected  by 
modest  changes  in the estimated  covariance matrix. 
3. An autocovariance  function  computed  using alternative parameters estimated  via FIML 
produce  a nearly identical plot. Figure 1 COMPARISON OF AUTOCOVARIANCE FUNCTIONS: VAR VS. 
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5.1 A DISTURBANCE-TERM  LUCAS  CRITIQUE 
Are  the  disturbance  processes  obtained  by  Rotemberg  and  Woodford 
likely to be stable across time and across policy regimes? It is difficult to 
see why  they would  be. The disturbances  have no theoretical basis, and 
are not  based  on  optimizing,  rational agent  behavior.  As  a result,  the 
Lucas critique applies in full force to the disturbances-which  is particu- 
larly bad news  for a model  that relies so heavily  on its disturbances  to 
produce  dynamics. 
6. An Internally  Consistent  Estimate  of Complex  Error 
Processes 
Rotemberg  and  Woodford use  a mixture of rational and VAR-based ex- 
pectations  to derive  the behavioral parameters and the error processes. 
One  can derive  both jointly, under  the assumption  of rational expecta- 
tions.  A general linear rational-expectations  model may be written 
HiEt-jZt+i =  Et, 
i= -k 
where  the  Hi are square  coefficient  matrices,  the  Z+,i are endogenous 
variables,  and the  Et are innovations.  This definition  is sufficiently  gen- 
eral  to  include  different  expectations,  viewpoint  dates,  and  complex 
error structures.  In particular, the disturbances  to the behavioral  equa- 
tions  may  follow  any  vector  ARMA process,  or they  may  depend  on 
lagged  Z's as in Rotemberg and Woodford's model,  by a suitable expan- 
sion  of the  state space.  A simple  example  of an error structure that fits 
into the framework is 
Et(Rt+2  - 
Irt+3  +  0Yt+2  -  Yt+l)  +  Ut  =  0, 
Ut  -  a_ -  bu t-1  +  C6t-1  =  Et, 
where the first equation is the authors' IS curve, and the disturbance term, 
ut, has an ARMA (1,1) structure, and also depends  on lagged  inflation. 
Rotemberg  and Woodford  solve  for the model  disturbances  as a par- 
ticular linear  combination  of lagged  observables  and  VAR innovations 
[see their equation  (5.5)]. However,  note that by doing so, the two "real" 
disturbances  are no longer orthogonal  in general,  since the Z's are obvi- 
ously  not  orthogonal.  It is  possible  to write  this  specification  into  the Figure 2 COMPARISON OF AUTOCORRELATION FUNCTIONS 
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model  from the start, and to estimate  the structural parameters and the 
error processes  jointly, assuming  rational expectations  throughout.4 
I perform this exercise,  estimating  the structural parameters of Rotem- 
berg and  Woodford's  model  jointly  with  an error process  that has  the 
simple  structure 
ut = A(L)Zt_1  +  ,t. 
I impose  orthogonality  of the  funds-rate  error with  respect  to the  two 
"real" errors in  this  estimation.  The parameters  K,  r, oa, and  A(L) are 
estimated jointly, via maximum likelihood.  While the resulting structural 
parameter  estimates  differ from Rotemberg  and  Woodford's  estimates 
(due  to  the  different  expectational  assumption),  Figure 2 of  this  com- 
ment  shows  that this  technique  also provides  a near-perfect match be- 
tween  the model's  and the VAR's vector autocorrelation function.5 
7.  Summary 
Because  the  paper  aspires  to  use  its  optimization-based  econometric 
framework  for monetary  analysis,  one  must  ultimately  provide  an an- 
swer  to  the  central question:  Could  I comfortably  use  Rotemberg  and 
Woodford's  model  for monetary  policy  analysis  and  advice? All in all, 
the answer  to this question  for me must be no, because: 
1.  The model  doesn't  really empirically  address  the  Lucas critique for 
the  structural  parameters,  and  thus  may  be  subject  to  instability 
across different policy regimes. 
2.  The estimation  method  used  to obtain the behavioral  parameters  is 
inefficient  and not generalizable. 
3.  The link between  inertial monetary  policy and the jump behavior  of 
the rest of the model  seems  peculiar. This suggests  that, other than 
the reaction function,  the model  does  not jibe well with the data. 
4.  As  evidence  of this proposition,  the model  relies almost  exclusively 
on its error structure to replicate the dynamics  in the VAR. It is diffi- 
cult to imagine  providing  advice to an FOMC member of the follow- 
ing  kind:  "monetary  policy  should  ease  because  the  disturbances 
4. No computational  constraint  prevents  us from  modeling  the error  processes  jointly  with 
the structural  parameters.  King and Watson (1995)  and Anderson and Moore (1985) 
utilize techniques  that handle these cases perfectly  well. 
5. My estimate  of the intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  (1/a)  is quite  a bit smaller  than 
their estimate,  K is considerably  larger,  and qi is consistent  with a large  range  of values 
for a's and  /s  in the price specification.  The innovations-the  E,'s-are (of course) 
whitened at these estimates. Comment  355 
have all been large and positive  of late, and we expect them to persist 
at those  levels  for the next four to eight quarters." 
5.  The error processes  cannot be assumed  stable with respect to regime 
shifts,  and are thus subject to the Lucas critique. 
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Carnegie  Mellon University  and NBER 
In  my  own  work  on  monetary  policy  rules-e.g.,  McCallum  (1988, 
1997)-I  have  favored  a research  strategy  centering  around  the  rules' 
robustness,  in the following  sense: Because there is a great deal of profes- 
sional disagreement  as to the proper specification of a structural macro- 
economic  model,  it seems  likely to be more fruitful to strive to design  a 
policy rule that works reasonably well in a variety of plausible quantitative 
models,  rather than to derive a rule that is optimal in any one particular 
model.  Obviously, Rotemberg and Woodford have chosen the latter, more 
conventional  strategy over the one that I have promoted.1 A supporter of 
the  robustness  approach  does  not  need  to  disapprove  of  their  study, 
however,  especially  if he/she  views  the paper's model-building  contribu- 
tion as more significant  than the policy-rule exercises.  Furthermore, the 
robustness  approach can operate at the level of the research community 
rather than  the  individual;  Rotemberg and Woodford's  model  could  in 
principle be one of those in which I would  want a policy rule to perform 
reasonably well. 
In fact, there is much  to be said in favor of attempts  such as theirs to 
build small quantitative  macro models  in which  the agents  are depicted 
as solving  dynamic optimization  problems,  but with some type of nomi- 
1. The robustness  approach  is also recommended  by Blanchard  and Fischer  (1989,  p. 582) 
and implicitly  by Bryant,  Hooper,  and Mann (1993). 
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nal price and/or wage  stickiness  built in so as to create a significant link 
between  monetary  policy  actions and real output  responses.2  This type 
of study  potentially  combines  the theoretical discipline  of real business- 
cycle analysis  with  the empirical discipline  of econometric  modeling.  As 
the  authors  clearly  explain,  such  an  approach  offers  in  principle  the 
prospect  of yielding  a quantitative model that is structural and therefore 
potentially  immune  to the Lucas critique. This is, in fact, just the type of 
analysis  that Lucas's work was pointing  to in the 1970s before the macro 
profession  got somewhat  sidetracked by the notion  that cyclical fluctua- 
tions might be due almost entirely to technology  shocks. Today there is a 
lot of promising  work of this type  going  on; Rotemberg and Woodford 
mention  a few  studies,  and there are several others discussed  and ana- 
lyzed by Nelson  (1997a, 1997b). It should be mentioned,  I think, that this 
line of work was pioneered  in a yet to be published  paper by King (1990). 
Thus I find the general outline of Rotemberg and Woodford's paper to 
be praiseworthy  and their execution to be extremely skillful and sophisti- 
cated. But there are a few features of their model that seem unattractive, 
and I find their policy-rule  analysis,  as well  as their model-testing  exer- 
cises,  to be unconvincing.  Accordingly,  the rest of this comment  will be 
devoted  to criticisms,  even  though  there is much to praise in the paper. 
One  of my main objections  is to Rotemberg and Woodford's assump- 
tion that the central bank knows  the value  of the current quarter's real 
output  rate when  setting  the  interest  rate-its  policy  instrument-for 
that  quarter.  That  this  assumption  is  seriously  counterfactual  is  illus- 
trated in  a recent  paper  by Ingenito  and  Trehan (1996), in which  they 
update  the  San Francisco Fed's  statistical procedure  for estimating  the 
current quarter's real GDP.3 In this procedure,  the estimate  is based  on 
observations  on  monthly  data (such  as industrial  production,  employ- 
ment  levels,  etc.)  during  the quarter, as well  as on lagged  values  of the 
real GDP itself.  A total of 34 such  monthly  series are considered,  with 
the final estimating  equation  using  two  of them.  What this study  indi- 
cates  is that the  estimates  of a current quarter's real GDP made  about 
two-thirds  of  the  way  through  the  quarter have  a  root-mean-square 
(RMS) error of  about  1.5% (annualized).  That figure  suggests  a 95% 
confidence  interval that is about 6 percentage points in width.  And even 
at the  end of  the  quarter the  RMS error is  almost  as  large.  So  a 95% 
confidence  internal for the quarter's real GDP growth rate could include 
negative  values  and also values above 4% (annualized)-i.e.,  both reces- 
sion  and boom  values!  Consequently,  to assume  that monetary  policy- 
2. The  reference  here  is  to  links  at  cyclical  frequencies,  not  to  departures  from  su- 
perneutrality  that require substantial effects on the stock of capital. 
3. An earlier version  is discussed  by Trehan (1992). On the topic,  also see Meltzer (1987). Comment  357 
makers  can  respond  to  actual  GDP  and  inflation  rates  seems  highly 
unrealistic.4 Figure 14 of Cochrane's (1994) paper shows  that this matters 
somewhat  for the  shape  of impulse  response  functions  such as Rotem- 
berg and  Woodford's  Figure  1; a much  more  serious  issue  will be dis- 
cussed  shortly. 
I  am  also  uncomfortable  with  the  assumed  model  restriction  that 
monetary  policy  actions  have  no  effect  on  consumption  demand  and 
output until two quarters later. A one-quarter delay would seem defensi- 
ble,  if questionable,  but not two  quarters. The 1980 imposition  and re- 
moval  of credit controls was  admittedly  not a monetary policy action of 
the  usual  sort,  but  it was  a demand-side  action  taken  via  the  central 
bank-and  its  effects  clearly  showed  response  lags  of  less  than  two 
months. 
For their specification  of price-setting behavior, Rotemberg and Wood- 
ford begin  with  the  Calvo-Rotemberg  model,  which  has  recently  be- 
come  the closest  thing  there is to a standard specification-see  Roberts 
(1995). But then  they  make  two  modifications.  First, they  assume  that 
prices newly  set in period t are based only on information from periods 
t -  1 and earlier. Then,  second,  they assume  that for a substantial frac- 
tion of the sellers there is an additional  quarter's delay before the price 
change goes into effect. These modifications,  like the assumption  regard- 
ing the consumption  lag, help  to make the model's  responses  to mone- 
tary policy  shocks  more similar to those  that are found  empirically, but 
they do so in a rather arbitrary manner. Invoking such lags seems at least 
somewhat  inconsistent  with  the objective of "rigorously grounding  our 
structural relations in optimizing  individual  behavior" (Section 1). 
In response  to such objections  to their model,  Rotemberg and Wood- 
ford might reply that it performs quite well empirically, as evidenced  by 
their Figures 2 and 3. In the first of these,  the autocorrelation and cross- 
correlation  functions  for  output,  interest,  and  inflation  are  shown  to 
match very  closely  those  of an unrestricted  VAR, whereas  in the latter 
the  simulated  time  paths  are shown  to  match  very  closely  the  actual 
historical  paths  (when  the  historical  policy  rule is used).  It should  be 
pointed  out,  however,  that in presenting  these  matches  the authors do 
not indicate  what  fraction of the variables' behavior is explained  by the 
motivated  portion  of the model's  relationships,  as opposed  to that por- 
tion that comes  from its serially correlated disturbances.  My preconfer- 
ence  guess  was  that much  of the  model's  "explanatory" power  comes 
from the predictable part of the disturbances,  so that the autocorrelation 
and cross-correlation  plots would  look much less impressive  if this por- 
4. Although it must be said that the interval  is narrower  for inflation. 358 *  McCALLUM 
tion due  to the disturbances  were eliminated,  thereby making the plots 
more  nearly comparable  to those  in Fuhrer and Moore (1995).5 The re- 
sults  in Fuhrer's comment  in this volume  are supportive  of that guess. 
The foregoing  argument should  not be interpreted as a claim that only 
white-noise  residuals  should  be permitted  in a model.  There are good 
reasons  to believe  that (e.g.)  preference and technology  shocks are likely 
to be quite persistent,  closer to random walks than to white  noise.  And 
the lagged  output terms in Fuhrer and Moore's IS function plays a rather 
similar  role  to  the  autocorrelated  disturbances  in  Rotemberg  and 
Woodford's  model.  But Fuhrer and  Moore's  lagged  output  terms  are 
clearly  visible;  the  reader  can  see  what  they  are  and  then  consider 
whether  they  can be  sensibly  rationalized.  So  my  argument  could  be 
viewed  as a suggestion  that Rotemberg  and Woodford report informa- 
tion  concerning  the  autocorrelation  properties  of their disturbances  so 
that  readers  can  make  more  informed  judgments  as  to  whether  their 
model's  empirical performance is or is not impressive. 
Let  us  now  consider  Rotemberg  and  Woodford's  simulations  with 
alternative  policy  rules.  Here I think that they are quite correct in their 
finding that "relatively little of the variability in output or inflation in this 
period  can be attributed to the monetary  policy shocks" (Section 6) and 
also to emphasize  that "these results do not imply that monetary policy is 
unimportant"  (Section  6). Instead,  it is the systematic  part of the Fed's 
policy behavior  that has been  of major quantitative importance,  at least 
for the time period studied  and probably for the entire postwar era. 
There are, however,  some aspects of the simulation results with alterna- 
tive policy rules that are in my judgment  highly questionable.  In particu- 
lar, the results  reported  in Rotemberg and Woodford's  Table 2 indicate 
that by increasing  the strength  of the policy responses  to current depar- 
tures of output and inflation from their target values, i.e., by increasing 0y 
and 0,, the variances of those departures can be sharply reduced relative 
to historical policy  and relative to the Taylor-rule settings  with  0y =  0.5 
and 0, = 1.5. But, as was emphasized  above, actual central banks have to 
respond  to lagged  values  of Yt  and  7rt,  or to expectations  of current or 
future values  that are based  on lagged  observations  of various (endoge- 
nous)  variables.  Accordingly,  the  possibility  that explosive  oscillations 
will be caused by excessively  strong feedback-often  termed instrument 
instability-becomes  prominent.  Suppose,  for example,  that the analyst 
were to adopt the policy-rule values in row 4 or row 5 of Table 2 (0y  = 5, 0, 
5. In the Fuhrer-Moore  (1995)  model, all disturbances  are white noise, so the correlation 
functions reflect only the motivated portion of its relationships.  Their  model does in- 
clude, however, lagged output and real interest-rate  terms whose motivation  is some- 
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=  1 or 0y =  0,  0r =  10) but  used  the  previous  quarter's  observations  on  Yt 
and  frt  in the  rule  rather  than  the  current  quarter's.  Then  there  would  be a 
real  danger  of  instrument  instability.6  More  generally,  I believe  that  the 
advice  for central  banks  to respond  much  more  strongly  to signals  indicat- 
ing  that  target  variables  are  differing  from  their  target  values7  is  truly 
dangerous.  And  for basically  the  same  reason-that  the  assumed  policy- 
rule  specification  is  nonoperational-I  am  dubious  about  some  of  the 
other  policy  results  reported  by  Rotemberg  and  Woodford,  even  though 
they  are  nicely  illustrative  of the  potential  for models  built  in the  praise- 
worthy  manner  that  their  introduction  promotes. 
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Discussion 
Olivier Blanchard asked for clarification regarding the results of the coun- 
terfactual  monetary  policy  experiments.  In  particular,  he  wanted  to 
know  whether  he  should  take  seriously  the  finding  that,  by  using  a 
different  policy  rule,  the  Fed  could  have  avoided  the  recession  of  the 
early  1980s  while  still  bringing  down  the  rate of  inflation.  Woodford 
responded  that  a crucial assumption  underlying  the  exercise  was  that 
the alternative  policy  rule was  credible. He agreed that this was  not an 
innocuous  assumption.  Matthew  Shapiro added  that another  possible 
reason for the result was that the nominal inertia in the model applies to 
prices rather than to inflation; with "sticky" inflation (which is suggested 
by some empirical studies),  the recessionary costs of a disinflation might 
well be greater. 
Torsten Persson reiterated discussant  Jeffrey Fuhrer's concern that the 
model's  dynamics  may come more from the exogenous  shock processes 
than from its internal propagation  mechanisms.  He drew the analogy to 
the  critique of  time-to-build  models  made  by  Cogley  and  Nason,  that 
"you get out what you put in." Robert Hall followed  up on the propaga- 
tion  issue,  suggesting  that in  neglecting  the  labor market the  authors 
were  missing  an  important  source  of  persistence.  For example,  after 
people  lose  their  jobs  during  a  recession  it  takes  time  to  reestablish 
worker-job  matches.  John Haltiwanger  concurred, citing the 1981-1982 
recession  as a case  in which  most  of the  decline  in employment  came 
from job destruction.  In his own  work,  he has found  much of the reac- 
tion  to  a monetary  policy  shock  estimated  in  simple  VARs to coincide 
with fluctuations  in the rate of job destruction. 
Robert King questioned  the reasonableness  of the model's assumption 
that consumption  is set two periods in advance.  Because consumption  is 
the interest-sensitive  component  of demand  in the model,  he wondered 
how  this assumption  affected the determination  of the real interest rate, 
and whether  in the short run the real interest rate is "disconnected" from 
the driving forces of the model. 
Christopher  Carroll questioned  the  validity  of welfare  analyses  in a 
model that is so highly aggregated.  He noted, for example, that the magni- 
tude  of aggregate  consumption  fluctuations  may greatly understate  the 
variability in consumption  experienced by some families, because most of 
the variation in employment  is due to lost jobs rather than a reduction in 
hours.  Thus  a given  variation  in aggregate  employment,  for example, 
may have larger overall effects on welfare than is calculated in the paper. 
Finally,  the  authors  responded  to  some  issues  raised  by  the  dis- Discussion 361 
cussants.  Rotemberg  remarked  that  it would  be  useful  to  investigate 
Bennett  McCallum's  concern  that  lagged  reactions  by  the  Fed  might 
induce  instrument  instability. He thought  that instability was less likely 
to be an issue  in the structural model,  as opposed  to in the reduced-form 
VAR, since  forward-looking  agents  would  anticipate large interest-rate 
changes  by  the  Fed  if  prices  were  adjusted  in  the  current  period. 
Woodford disagreed with a suggestion  by Fuhrer that the paper's estima- 
tion method  is not internally consistent  because  the theoretical impulse 
responses  are  calculated  assuming  no  structure  to  the  other  distur- 
bances.  He said that, in fact, all of the impulse responses  were computed 
under the assumption  of independence  of the policy and nonpolicy  dis- 
turbances.  He  also  defended  the  absence  of  explicit  lag  terms  in  the 
model,  on the grounds  that it was useful  to keep the model as simple as 
possible  subject  to  the  requirement  that  it  is  able  to  fit  the  impulse 
responses  from the VAR. Finally, Woodford took issue with a criticism of 
the model  made by McCallum, that it does  not explicitly include money 
balances.  Woodford  noted  that a money  demand  equation  could easily 
be appended;  he  also  suggested  that more formal modeling  of money 
demand  was not worthwhile  in this context, as the distortions due to the 
use of money  in transactions are small when  the nominal interest rate is 
low, as is the case in the simulations. 